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Walking the Edge of Death: An Annotated 
Bibliography on Juveniles, the Mentally Ill, 
the Mentally Retarded and the Death Penalty 
SUSAN M. BOLAND-
The death penalty is not so monolithic as it seems at first glance. A 
storm of debate has centered around the application of this, the harshest 
criminal penalty of all, to the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. 
They are our most vulnerable and least culpable citizens. 
This bibliography consists of annotated references to periodical articles, 
books, Web sites, and Supreme Court cases that examine the application of the 
death penalty to juveniles, the mentally ill, and the mentally retarded. It does 
not include newspaper articles, popular magazines, Web sites that offer no 
substantive content, or materials that are unobtainable from major research 
libraries. Due to the vast quantity of material on the death penalty, this 
bibliography is not comprehensive. Omissions do not necessarily reflect a 
qualitative judgment about the material omitted. The bibliography has been 
organized under three subject headings: I. Juveniles, n. Mentally Dl, and m. 
Mentally Retarded. The three subject headings are further subdivided into A. 
Supreme Court Cases and B. Books, Articles, and Web Sites. 
I. Juveniles 
A. United States Supreme Court Cases .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 132 
B. Books, Articles, and Web Sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
n. Mentally TIl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
A. United States Supreme Court Cases & Louisiana 
Supreme Court Case .............................. 180 
B. Books, Articles, and Web Sites ....................... 182 
m. Mentally Retarded ................................... " 219 
A. United States Supreme Court Cases ................... 219 
B. Books, Articles, and Web Sites ..................... " 220 
* J.D., Northern Dlinois University; M.L.S., University of Illinois. Assistant 
Professor and Research and Instructional Services Librarian, Northern lllinois University 
College of Law Library. The author wishes to thank John Austin, Director of the Law Library 
for his assistance and Lynne Smith for her interlibrary loan efforts. 
131 
HeinOnline -- 21 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 132 2001
132 NORTHERN IWNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 21 
I. JUVENILES 
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978). 
This case involves a defendant who was sixteen-years-old at the time of 
the crime and who was labeled as mentally deficient, emotionally 
unstable, and immature for his age. The Ohio death penalty statute 
strictly limited the mitigating factors which could be considered. 
Certiorari was granted to determine whether the Ohio statute violated the 
defendant's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because 
it prevented the sentencer from considering the particular circumstances 
of his crime and his character as mitigating factors. The Court vacated 
and remanded the case because the Ohio statute did not permit the . 
individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eight 
and Fourteenth Amendments, as held in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978). Justices Blackmun and Marshall concurred. 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
This case involved a defendant who was sixteen-years-old at the time of 
the crime. On petition to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that 
the death sentence, under the particular circumstances of this case, was 
excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The defendant also 
argued that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the death 
penalty for sixteen-year-olds. The Supreme Court vacated the death 
sentence and remanded the case because the trial court refused to consider 
the defendant's unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance as 
mitigating evidence. This meant the death sentence was imposed without 
the individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as held by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978). The Court saw this mitigating evidence as particularly 
relevant due to the defendant's youth. Justice O'Connor wrote a 
concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, 
and Rehnquist dissented. They criticized the majority for addressing the 
mitigation issue which was raised for the first time in the brief to the 
Supreme Court. They also criticized the majority for trying to dictate the 
weight that state cowts must attach to mitigating circumstances. 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
Two cases were consolidated for this decision, Stanford v. Kentucky and 
Wilkins v. Missouri. One defendant was seventeen and the other was 
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sixteen. The question on appeal was the constitutionality of executing 
offenders under eighteen. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' 
Eighth Amendment arguments and affmned the state court decisions. The 
plurality, made up of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, White, and 
Kennedy, looked flrst at the evolving standards of decency. The plurality 
declined to look at legislative enactments that did not deal with capital 
punishment and at those states without capital punishment. The plurality 
also rejected public opinion polls, interest groups, and the views of the 
international community. Furthermore, the plurality rejected the second 
part of the traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, the proportionality 
test. The plurality held there was no national consensus that sixteen-and-
seventeen-year-oIds should not be executed and thus such executions do 
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring 
opinion, where she found no national consensus prohibiting imposition of 
the death penalty on sixteen-or-seventeen-year-olds but did state the Court 
needed to conduct a proportionality analysis. The dissent, made up of 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, applied the evolving 
standards of decency test and came to the opposite conclusion of the 
plurality. They also applied a proportionality analysis and found juveniles 
sufficiently less culpable than adults so that the death penalty was 
disproportionate. They stated that executing offenders for a crime 
committed when below eighteen was cruel and unusual punishment. 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
In this case, for the flrst time, the Supreme Court tackled head-on the 
issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of 
juveniles. The defendant, William Wayne Thompson, was flfteen-years-
old when the crime was committed. The plurality, made up of Justices 
Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, employed an evolving 
standards of decency test for the first part of its analysis. The plurality 
looked at legislative enactments, jury determinations, and views of the 
international community and religious and political leaders. For the 
second part of its analysis, the plurality looked at the proportionality of 
the punishment to the personal culpability of the defendant. The 
plurality held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a 
person under sixteen at the time of the offense. Justice O'Connor 
concurred in the opinion. She stated that although a national consensus 
prohibiting the execution of persons under sixteen probably existed, 
better evidence was needed. However, she found that due to the nature 
of the death penalty, defendants under sixteen may not be executed 
pursuant to a death penalty statute that gives no minimum age. Justices 
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Scalia, Rehnquist, and White dissented. They applied the evolving 
standards of decency test but came to the opposite conclusion. They 
rejected the proportionality test. 
B. ARTICLES, BOOKS, AND WEB SITES 
ACLU, Ranks of Youth on Death Row Growing, at http://www.aclu.orglnews/ 
2000/w082200a.html (Aug. 22, 2000). 
This web page reports on the execution of Alexander Williams, a 
juvenile on Georgia's death row. The report discusses the growing 
number of juveniles on death row and the circumstances surrounding 
Alexander Williams' case. 
Rolayne Ailts, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: An Analysis of the Death 
Penalty as Applied to Juvenile Offenders, 34 S.D. L. REv. 762 (1989). 
After an overview of the juvenile justice system and death penalty 
jurisprudence, the author critiques the evolving standards of decency 
analysis in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The author 
argues the evolving standards of decency analysis is too uncertain and 
susceptible to different interpretations. The article suggests a more 
consistent approach would be the disproportionality analysis. The author 
concludes that under a disproportionality analysis, the juvenile death 
penalty is always disproportionate because minors are always less 
responsible for their crimes than adults. The author also looks at the 
goals of capital punishment and concludes neither retribution nor 
deterrence supports juvenile executions. 
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (James R. Acker et at. 
eds., 1998). 
This book looks at the experiment of capital punishment post-Furman v. 
Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), and discusses its failures. The chapters, 
which are written by different authors, examine: public opinion, law, 
politics, deterrence, incapacitation and future dangerousness, women, 
children, the mentally retarded, the innocent, incompetent counsel, death-
qualified juries, mitigation, discrimination, habeas corpus, cost of the 
death penalty, physician involvement, families of victims and offenders, 
life on death row, clemency, and executions. Chapters relevant to this 
bibliography have been individually cited. 
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Amnesty International, Amnesty International Website Against the Death 
Penalty, at http://www.web.amnesty.orglnnp/dplibrary.nsf/index (last visited 
Oct. 1,2000). 
This site contains extensive substantive infonnation concerning the death 
penalty. Amnesty International reports on the death penalty are available 
in their Web site library going back to 1996. These reports cover many 
death penalty issues, including those concerning the mentally ill, 
mentally retarded, and juveniles. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR 51/57/98, BETRA YINO THE 
YOUNG: HUMANRIOHTS VIOLATIONS AOAINSTCHILDREN IN THE U.S. JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (1998). 
This Amnesty International report discusses human rights violations 
concerning juveniles. Part V specifically discusses juveniles and the 
death penalty. It asserts that the execution of juveniles violates their 
human rights. The report argues the United States is violating the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. It also discusses the Supreme Court decision 
of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The report condemns 
the use of the death penalty and reports that capital juries do not always 
consider the defendant's youth and background. The report ends with a 
recommendation that the United States withdraw its reservation to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratify the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and ensure states comply with the 
international standards concerning the execution of juveniles. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR 51/01187, UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY (1987). 
This book gives an overview of the death penalty in America. It contains 
a chapter on juvenile death sentences, that discusses United States 
domestic standards, the Roach case, and international practice. It also 
contains a chapter on the execution of the mentally ill, covering five 
cases. The appendices contain summaries of important United States 
Supreme Court rulings and death penalty statistics. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR 51123/91, UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1991). 
This anti-death penalty report reviews the history, laws, and practice of 
executing juvenile offenders. It summarizes Amnesty International's 
findings regarding the cases of twenty-three juveniles sentenced to death. 
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American Society of Criminology, Critical Criminology Division, Death 
Penalty Information & Resources, at http://sun.soci.niu.edul-critcrimldp/ 
dp.html (last visited on Oct. 1,2000). 
This anti-capital punishment site contains links to Department of Justice 
Capital Punishment Statistics, and a page of links on information about 
juveniles and the death penalty. These links contain information on 
juveniles executed, juveniles on death row, and treaties against executing 
juveniles. 
James C. Anders, Punish the Guilty, 72 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 32. 
In this article the author argues age should be a factor in sentencing, not 
an absolute bar to capital punishment for juveniles. 
Linda Andre-Wells, Comment, Imposing the Death Penalty Upon Juvenile 
Offenders: A Current Application of the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition 
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21 N.M. L. REv. 373 (1991). 
After a discussion of the history of the juvenile death penalty and an 
examination of current death penalty statutes, the author looks at 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989). She concludes the divisive nature of the decisions 
leaves the question of juvenile executions open and speculates it might 
best be answered by sentencing juries and judges in light of individual 
case circumstances rather than having the politically motivated 
legislators and judiciary set an arbitrary age. 
Gregory Bassham, Note, Rethinking the Emerging Jurisprudence of Juvenile 
Death, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETIiICS & PUB. POL'y 467 (1991). 
This note discusses the recent abandonment of the traditional 
proportionality analysis by Supreme Court conservatives. After a 
background on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the author looks at the 
dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and the plurality 
in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 392 (1989). He argues Justice Scalia's Eighth Amendment 
interpretation departs from controlling precedent. He addresses Scalia's 
arguments for abandoning the proportionality analysis and refutes the 
textualist argument and the majoritarian argument. He defends the 
traditional Eighth Amendment analysis and then applies the analysis to 
the juvenile death penalty. He argues the juvenile death penalty is 
arbitrary and capricious, and that juveniles possess less culpability than 
adult offenders. He concludes the execution of juveniles fifteen or 
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younger violates the Eighth Amendment, and that the emerging Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence should be rejected. 
Terrie A. Bechdel, Life or Death? An Objective Analysis of Capital 
Punishment For Juveniles (1986) (unpublished M.S. thesis, California State 
University) (on file with the California State University Library). 
This thesis analyzes literature, statutes, Supreme Court decisions, and 
statistics pertaining to the juvenile death penalty. The author looks at the 
issue of the juvenile death penalty from both the retentionist and 
abolitionist perspectives. The author suggests further research is needed 
to explore attitudes toward juveniles who commit murder, and to identify 
and prevent the problem of juvenile violence. 
Philip C. Berg, Recent Developments, 13 MARY. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 415 
(1990). 
This article reviews Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author asserts that 
critics of the decisions have an incomplete understanding of the Supreme 
Court's holdings. He asserts the debate in Penry and Stanford is not 
focused on the culpability of juvenile and mentallyretarded offenders but 
is on federalism and the role of the Court. He argues a case-by-case 
analysis is appropriate and that principles of federalism dictate this 
analysis is a state role. He concludes this federalism is more appropriate 
than a bright line federal rule prohibiting executions of juveniles and the 
mentally retarded. 
Glenn M. Bieler, Note, Death Be Not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital 
Punishment, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 179 (1990). 
This note looks at Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and concludes the juvenile 
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. He examines the juvenile 
offender's reduced culpability, looking at the state's duty as parens 
patriae, waiver into adult court, and "time of life" aspects of 
adolescence. He analyzes the Court's defmition of Eighth Amendment 
consensus and concludes the fate of the juvenile death penalty depends 
on the Justices' defmitions of consensus. 
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Lee A. Bjorndal, Note, The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for Sixteen 
and Seventeen Year Old Offenders: Stanford v. Kentucky, 11 RAMLINEJ. PuB. 
L. &POL'Y 175 (1990). 
This case note analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The 
author argues the plurality failed to properly examine whether a national 
consensus on capital punishment exists and failed to conduct a 
proportionality analysis as required by precedent. The author concludes 
the plurality destroyed any opportunity for future Eighth Amendment 
challenges to the death penalty. 
WILLIAM J. BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATII AS PuNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984). 
This book presents a historical examination of the death penalty. It also 
contains studies of post-Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), cases. 
The book argues the death penalty is still racially discriminatory, does 
not deter, and is arbitrary in its application. The appendix lists ~tate­
imposed executions and the offender's age at execution. 
Richard J. Brody, Don't Kill Children, 72 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 32. 
In this opposing view to James C. Ander's article Punish the Guilty, the 
author argues juveniles should not be executed. He asserts their moral, 
emotional, and intellectual development differs from adults; juveniles are 
not deterred by the death penalty; juveniles are more likely than adults 
to be rehabilitated; and the death penalty is imposed disproportionately 
on African-American juveniles. 
Bruce L. Brown, The Juvenile Death Penalty in Washington: A State 
Constitutional Analysis, 15 U. PuGET SOUND L. REv. 361 (1992). 
In this article, the author argues imposing the death penalty on a juvenile 
violates Article 1, Section 14 of the Washington Constitution. After 
examining the Supreme Court cases of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the author 
looks at Washington's death penalty statute and analyzes it under the 
Washington Constitution. First, the author determines that Washington's 
protections against cruel punishment are broader than the Eighth 
Amendment. Next, he looks at a four part test the Washington Supreme 
Court has set out for analyzing Article 1, Section 14. He concludes that 
three of the four factors support the fact that juvenile executions are a 
cruel punishment under the Washington Constitution. 
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David Bruck, An Attorney Decries Juvenile Executions, in YOUNG BLOOD 159 
(Shirley Dicks ed., i995). 
This chapter discusses the case of the youngest person to be executed 
during this century. It details the lack of a psychiatric evaluation of the 
defendant, the prejudicial venue, and the fact that the defendant's family 
had no resources or understanding of the legal system. The author uses 
this case to illustrate the problems with the juvenile death penalty. 
Richard Burr and Mandy Welch, Killing Kids Who Kill: Desecrating the 
Sanctuary of Childhood, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1998). 
This article is taken from a death penalty symposium reflecting on the 
death penalty twenty-five years after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972). The authors point out the international and human rights 
communities condemn the juvenile death penalty. They note that 
problems such as mental illness, histories of child abuse, and race 
discrimination, seen in the adult death penalty, are also found with the 
juvenile condemned. They discuss Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815 (1988), and Stanjordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). They argue 
juries do not give full consideration to youth as a mitigating factor but 
rather often view youth as an aggravating factor concerning future 
dangerousness. They see the juvenile death penalty as evidence that the 
United States is abdicating its responsibility toward children. They urge 
a call against juvenile executions. 
A CAPITAL PuNISHMENT ANTHOLOGY (Victor Streib ed., 1993). 
This is an anthology of law review articles dealing with the death 
penalty. The majority of articles in the anthology oppose capital 
punishment. The anthology includes two articles that deal specifically 
with the issue of juvenile executions, one for and one against. Those 
articles are included separately in this bibliography. 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL? (Carol D. Foster et al. eds., 
Information Plus, 1992). 
Part of the Information Series on Current Topics, this book gives an 
overview of the capital punishment debate. It includes summaries of 
landmark Supreme Court rulings, including those dealing with juveniles, 
psychiatric testimony, the insane, and the mentally retarded. It also 
reviews death penalty statutes, looking at the minimum age for 
execution, and at the treatment of mental retardation. The book also 
gives statistical infonnation on executions, including breakdowns by age 
and education, and an overview of capital punishment around the world. 
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Sherri Ann Carver, Note, Retribution - A Justification For the Execution of 
Mentally Retarded and Juvenile Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 155 
(1991). 
The author of this note looks at Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), 
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and concludes these 
cases were correctly decided in light of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
and the retributive theory of jurisprudence. After analyzing the cases, 
she sets forth the general arguments against the death penalty and rebuts 
them. She discusses the deterrence and retributive punishment theories 
and applies these theories to the circumstances in Penry and Stanford. 
She asserts both defendants were capable of distinguishing right from 
wrong and evaluating various courses of action because they both killed 
to escape detection. She argues in both.cases the sentencer is always free 
to reject the death penalty if the juvenile or mentally retarded offender 
is not sufficiently culpable. . 
J. David Clark, Jr., Note, Juveniles and the Death Penalty - A Square Peg in 
a Round Hole, 10 MISS. C. L. REv. 169 (1990). 
After a background of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment 
interpretations, the author analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815 (1988). He concludes the Court correctly interpreted the cruel and 
unusual punishments clause as it pertains to juvenile executions. He 
argues the plurality is not limited to finding a national consensus but 
acted properly in drawing the line. He asserts there exists a trend toward 
consensus in prohibiting juveniles younger than sixteen from being 
executed. He also argues children differ from adults and are less 
culpable. He asserts that this lesser culpability makes retribution an 
improper justification for executing minors. He states executing minors 
has no deterrent effect on adult offenders or other minors so that 
justification also does not support executing juveniles. 
Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A 
Violation of an Emerging Rule of Customary International Law, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 161 (1990). 
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
concludes the Court erred in rejecting the relevance of international law 
in an Eighth Amendment analysis. The author examines international 
human rights treaties and concludes the United States is free from any 
binding international agreements. She also looks at the incorporation of 
intemationallaw into federal common law. She finds barriers in this 
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application, due to the uncertainty that eighteen is the appropriate age to 
draw the line and to the isolationism of the United States. She examines 
whether the prohibition on juvenile executions has reached the status of 
customary international law and concludes it has not. Furthermore, she 
finds the United States is a persistent dissenter in the area of juvenile 
executions. She does find, however, that the United States courts must 
consult, although not necessarily follow, international law when dealing 
with domestic cases involving human rights. Thus, she concludes, the 
Stanford plurality erred in rejecting the use of these norms. 
Connie De La Vega and Jennifer Brown, Can A United States Treaty 
Reservation Provide a Sanctuary For the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F. 
L. REv. 735 (1998). 
The authors argue international law and opinion prohibit the execution 
of juveniles. They look at the arguments surrounding juvenile 
culpability, mitigating factors, racism, ineffective assistance of counsel, 
prosecutorial misconduct, and the death row phenomenon. They 
examine the Geneva Convention, American Convention of Human 
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other 
international agreements. They see any reservation by the United States 
to these agreements as void because such a reservation is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of such treaties, violates customary 
international law, and would conflict with jus cogens. The authors see 
the prohibition on the execution of juveniles as customary international 
law due to the wide spread state practice prohibiting it. They see the 
treaties discussed as evidence of opinio juris. They argue the United 
States is not a persistent objector since there was a defacto ban on 
juvenile executions while these agreements were being made. The 
authors also assert the almost worldwide prohibition of the juvenile death 
penalty rises to the level of jus cogens. The authors conclude with the 
hope that international scrutiny and condemnation will shame the United 
States into finally abolishing the juvenile death penalty. 
Connie De La Vega and Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the United 
States Has Been Called Upon to Determine the Legality of the Death Penalty 
in Michael Domingues v. Nevada, 21 WHITflER L. REv. 215 (1999). 
This article summarizes arguments made in an Amicus Curiae brief on 
behalf of Michael Domingues. The authors discuss the juvenile death 
penalty in light of international law and argue United States courts are 
prohibited from executing juveniles due to international law and 
international agreements of the United States. 
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Death Penalty Focus, at http://208.55.30.156/aboutlaboucmain.shtml (last 
visited Oct. I, 2000). 
This Web site is by an anti-death penalty organization. They publish 
educational materials and fact sheets on their Web site. The site has an 
article on human rights and the execution of juveniles. 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967). 
This anthology on capital punishment, edited by noted abolitionist Hugo 
Bedau, collects works presenting information about the history and 
implementation of the death penalty, arguments for and against the death 
penalty, social science research on death penalty issues, and case 
histories. This particular edition contains a section on juveniles and the 
death penalty that is omitted in later editions. 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed., 1982). 
This later edition of Hugo Bedau' s anthology on capital punishment 
includes chapters on deterrence, public attitudes towards the death 
penalty, error, constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and 
arguments for and against the death penalty. In the beginning chapters, 
Bedau discusses statutory mitigating circumstances such as diminished 
capacity, mental disturbance, and the age of the offender. 
Death Penalty Information Center at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 1,2000). 
This anti-death penalty site contains extensive information on the death 
penalty. It addresses special topics, among which are juveniles and the 
mentally retarded. The pages include statistics onjuveniles on death row 
and juveniles executed. It also looks at recent developments and 
minimum execution ages by jurisdictions. 
Death Penalty.Net at http://www.deathpenalty.netl (last updated June 4, 
1999). 
This is an anti-death penalty Web site maintained by an intern of the 
ACLU Capital Punishment Project. The site contains facts and figures 
on the juvenile death penalty. The site also links to other Web sites with 
information on juveniles sentenced to death. 
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Death Penalty USA Pages at http://www.agitator.comldp/ (last visited Oct. 1. 
2000). 
This Web site is an anti-death penalty site maintained by an Amnesty 
International member. It contains lists of juveniles on death row and 
juveniles executed. It breaks these lists down by year and by state. 
Karen Rasmusson Di Donna. Note. Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. 
Missouri: Juveniles. Capital Crime and the Death Penalty. 11 CRIM. JUST. 1. 
469 (1989). 
The article examines Stanford v. Kentucky. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). and 
explores whether there is a national consensus against the juvenile death 
penalty. The author asserts the plurality erred in its analysis because it 
ignored the states that prohibited capital punishment. disregarded public 
opinion polls. and failed to recognize that retribution and deterrence are 
not furthered by the execution of juveniles. 
Shirley Dicks. Gary Graham: Juvenile On Death Row, in YOUNG BLOOD 181 
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995). 
This chapter discusses the case of Gary Graham, a seventeen year old 
African-American who was convicted on the basis of questionable 
identification by a single witness. Several crime scene witnesses were 
never called upon to testify. No one interviewed alibi witnesses. No 
information was given concerning childhood abuse. The chapter uses the 
case to highlight problems with the juvenile death penalty and the Texas 
clemency review process. 
Shirley Dicks, Juveniles On Death Row: Case Profiles, in YOUNG BLOOD 117 
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995). 
This chapter discusses eight cases of juvenile offenders sentenced to 
death. The cases note evidence of child abuse, drug or alcohol abuse, 
mental illness, and poor representation by the offender's attorney. 
Richard C. Dieter, International Perspectives On the Death Penalty: A Costly 
Isolation for the U.S., at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglinternational 
report.html. 
This report discusses the international trend toward the abolition of the 
death penalty and the United States' position as a violator of human 
rights. Among the issues discussed are juvenile executions. The report 
discusses several human rights treaties that the United States has signed 
but not ratified. It also discusses the costs of the United States' failure 
to abide by international law regarding capital cases. 
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Clifford K. Dome and Kenneth E. Gewerth, Imposing the Death Penalty on 
Juvenile Murderers: A Constitutional Assessment, 75 JUDICATURE 6 (1991). 
This piece gives a review of the standards and methods used to determine 
if a punishment is cruel and unusual and discusses judicial application of 
these standards to juvenile executions. The authors conclude the 
Supreme Court has no clear method for determining if a national 
consensus on the juvenile death penalty exists and that there is a 
fundamental disagreement about how the constitutionality of any 
punishment is to be judged. 
W. James Ellison, State Execution of Juveniles: Defining "Youth" as a 
Mitigating Factor for Imposing a Sentence of Less Than Death, 11 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REv. 1 (1987). 
The author asserts the Supreme Court failed to define or provide 
substantive guidelines for establishing the moral culpability of juvenile 
murderers in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). This leaves the 
sentencer with unguided discretion to interpret and define youth as a 
mitigating factor. He concludes future death penalty statutes must 
specifically define and address youth as a mitigating factor. 
Scott Allan Erickson, Note, The United States Becomes a Member of an 
International Majority Banning the Execution of Child Offenders, 13 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT'LLJ. 784 (1990). 
After a brief historical look at the death penalty and its application to 
minors, the author examines the international prohibition on juvenile 
executions. He concludes that even before Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815 (1988), the United States was bound by this international 
prohibition. He comments on the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, 
Article Six of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the American Convention on Civil and Human Rights. He concludes 
by applauding the Court's decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, which 
placed the United States in line with international law prohibiting 
juvenile executions. 
Licia A. Esposito, Note, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile and 
Mentally Retarded Offenders: A Precedential Analysis and Proposal for 
Reconsideration, 31 B.C. L. REv. 901 (1990). . 
The author examines the evolution of the Supreme Court's definition of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and looks at Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
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(1989), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). She concludes none 
of the Court's approaches adequately addresses the problems of juveniles 
and the mentally retarded. She argues the Court should adopt a 
compelling state interestlleast restrictive means approach to determine 
the constitutionality of juvenile and mentally retarded offender's death 
sentences. 
Alison R. Faltersack, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky: The Minimum Age for the 
Maximum Penalty - Death, 23 1. MARSHAu..L. REv. 453 (1990). 
This note analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
concludes the Court correctly held that imposing the death penalty on 
sixteen-and-seventeen-year-olds is not unconstitutional. The author finds 
the Court is correct because deference to legislative judgment is a 
necessity, and an examination of death penalty statutes reveals no 
national consensus against executing juveniles. The author finds the 
Court appropriately rejected other age-statutes and views of special 
interest groups and foreign countries. She asserts the Court correctly 
found juvenile executions can serve the penological goal of deterrence 
and retribution. The author finds two flaws in the Court's decision: that 
the Court ruled on a statistical fallacy when looking at jury decisions, 
and that it failed to conduct a proportionality analysis. 
Mike Farrell, On the Juvenile Death Penalty, 21 WmTIIER L. REv. 207 
(1999). 
The author discusses the juvenile death penalty ,looking to international 
law and the examples of other countries in an attempt to urge the 
prohibition of juvenile executions. 
Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children 
to Criminal CO"!rt in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 447. 
The author discusses the role of juvenile waiver into adult court in 
juvenile death penalty cases. She argues the Court erred in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989), when it failed to analyze the underlying waiver decisions. She 
looks at Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court 
case addressing the constitutionality of juvenile waiver. She then 
examines the use of Kent criteria in the waivers of Thompson, Stanford, 
and Wilkins. She fmds that in Thompson and Stanford, at least four 
justices viewed waiver provisions as evidence of legislative intent to 
execute minors. She notes courts weigh certain factors more heavily than 
others when ·waiving juveniles. She argues transfer to adult court does 
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not ensure only the most culpable minors are tried as adults. She asserts 
the decision to transfer may be based on bureaucratic reasons rather than 
an individualistic determination of blameworthiness. She also argues 
that unquestioned acceptance of transfer authority masks discrimination 
against minority juveniles, since they are more likely to be transferred 
than white juveniles. She suggests that if waiver is to continue, courts 
should have a presumption that a minor is not mature enough to be 
criminally culpable for the death penalty. 
Norman 1. Finkel et al., Killing Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and 
Community Sentiment, 12 BEHAV. SCI. &L. 5 (1994). 
The authors present the results of two controlled experiments with death-
qualified subjects. In the first experiment, they found significant case 
variables: as the heinousness of the crime increased, the age effect 
became less significant. The second experiment used the most heinous 
case from the first experiment and varied the type of defendant. The ages 
of the defendant ranged from thirteen to twenty-five. The results showed 
two discriminable breaks between the younger group and the combined 
middle and older group. 
Norman J. Finkel, Socio-Scientific Evidence and Supreme Court Numerology: 
When Justices Attempt Social Science, 11 BEHA V. SCI. & L. 67 (1993). 
This article examines the Supreme Court's analysis of objective indicia 
in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author reviews both 
the plurality and the dissent's social science analysis of legislative 
enactments. He finds fatal flaws in both. He asserts the appropriate 
denominator is fifty-two, the number of states and jurisdictions. He 
asserts juveniles are the group in question and adults are the control 
group. He defines the question as whether legislative treatment of 
juveniles and adults show significant differences. His results indicate a 
significant difference that deepens the younger the offender. The author 
rejects jury decision data because of the missing denominators such as 
the number of cases brought to trial or the number of cases with 
convictions. He looks at Justice Scalia's framing of the question, and 
concludes it contradicts precedent and presents an impossible burden. 
James P. Fisher, Comment, Capital Punishment For Juveniles - A 
Constitutional Minimum Set By Elastic Principles, 16 CAP. U. L. REv. 655 
(1987). 
After exploring the background of the Eighth Amendment, the author 
distills three elastic principles that define cruel and unusual: standards of 
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decency, dignity of man, and sentence by individu~lized consideration. 
He applies the issue of the juvenile death penalty to these principles. He 
argues contemporary indicators show that reasonable minds differ as to 
whether juvenile executions should be prohibited. He concludes this 
demonstrates a legal and social environment where a bright line age limit 
is premature. 
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Significance and Determination 0/ Customary 
International Human Rights Law: The Relevance o/Customary International 
Norms to the Death Penalty in the United States, 25 GA. J.OO'L & COMPo L. 
165 (1995/1996). 
The author examines international law and capital punishment. She 
notes United States' courts have largely ignored international law 
arguments. She hypothesizes three possible reasons: theories of 
customary law and the death penalty are flawed; advocacy of these 
theories is flawed; or capital punishment is so political that courts have 
ignored international law. The author then looks at some of the 
difficulties in determining whether customary law prohibits juvenile 
executions. She asserts that without proof that the prohibition on 
juvenile executions in the international scene is legally binding on the 
United States, there is no reason for United States' courts to use 
international law in Eighth Amendment interpretation. She argues, 
however, that there are good reasons to interpret unclear constitutional 
provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment, so as to be consistent with 
international law. She concludes that even assuming a strong theory of 
international customary law and intense advocacy, the death penalty is 
too political and the courts will be too reluctant to look at the issue 
through international law. 
Linda A. Foley, Florida After the Funnan Decision: The Effect 0/ Extralegal 
Factors on the Processing o/Capital Offense Cases, 5 BBHAv. SCI. &L. 457 
(1987). 
This study looks at defendants indicted for ftrst degree murder in Florida 
between 1972 and 1978. The data gathered included demographic 
information consisting of age, race, sex, education, and prior convictions. 
The author found age and the number of additional offenses to be two 
predictors that influenced trial outcomes at a statistically significant 
level. She found younger people were more likely to be adjudicated 
guilty than older people. She theorizes that younger defendants might 
appear more threatening to middle-aged or older jurors. The study also 
found the sex of the offender and the race of the victim influenced the 
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conviction and imposition ofthe death penalty. She concludes Florida's 
post-Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), statute has failed to 
eliminate discrimination in the death penalty's imposition. 
Donald T. Fox, Current Developments, 82 AM. J.lNT'LL. 601 (1988). 
This article reports on the decision of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights' finding that the United States had violated two provisions 
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The case 
involved two persons sentenced to death for crimes committed before 
they were eighteen. The Commission held that the rule prohibiting 
juvenile executions was jus cogens, and thus no derogation was 
permitted. The author asserts the Commission did not elaborate 
sufficiently on this holding. He argues that although the United States 
is not bound by the decision, it should be persuasive in an Eighth 
Amendment analysis of the evolving standards of decency. He raises the 
issue of foreign intervention in United States domestic policy, but notes 
the United States may have acquired limitations on human rights issues 
due to its membership iq the OAS (Organization of American States). 
John R. Frank, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky: Did the Court Bite the 
Constitutional Bullet?, 23 AKRON L. REv. 547 (1990). 
After a short historical review of juvenile capital punishment, the author 
. analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).' He finds the 
plurality's analysis of legislative and jury/prosecutor statistics is 
appropriate, however, he asserts the plurality erred when it failed to 
conduct a proportionality analysis. He argues this failure was harmless, 
due to the heinous nature of the crimes and the closeness of the 
defendants to their majority age. He criticizes Justice O'Connor's 
opinion for her requirement that state legislatures include a minimum age 
in their death penalty statutes. He also criticizes the dissent for its 
expansion of the national consensus analysis beyond the plurality's 
criteria, and for its decision that the punishment was excessive. 
Michael E. Garner, Capital Punishment For Minors, 151. Juv. L. 150 (1994). 
This article analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The 
author asserts the constitutionality of the death penalty for minors is 
dubious. He views Stanford as unreliable due to the split in reasoning 
and the departure of Justice White from the Court. He sees Thompson 
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), as even more precarious due to the 
current make up of the Court. 
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Elisabeth Gasparini, Note, Juvenile Capital Punishment: A Spectacle of a 
Child's Injustice, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1073 (1998). 
This note discusses a South Carolina juvenile death penalty case. The 
author argues that the constantly shifting legislation regarding the 
juvenile death penalty should not be the sole indicator of the evolving 
standards of decency. She asserts the national consensus standards of 
decency then becomes a majoritarian rule and a battle of statistical 
interpretation. The author criticizes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989), for ignoring international opinion. She argues international 
norms prohibit the execution of juveniles. She also criticizes the 
Stanford plurality for rejecting the proportionality test. She argues 
retribution and deterrence are not served by executing juveniles. She 
finds that the role of executioner conflicts with the state's role of parens 
patriae. 
Steven N. Gersten, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile Offenders: 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 91 (1988). 
The author considers the juvenile death penalty and concludes the 
execution of juveniles should be prohibited. He first looks at the history 
of juvenile executions and the juvenile justice system. He examines the 
process of waiver into adult court and finds it flawed. He argues the 
legislative trend prohibiting execution of juveniles, the reluctance of 
juries to sentence juveniles to death, and public opinion polls show the 
contemporary standards of society do not support the juvenile death 
penalty. He finds further support for this when he looks at international 
law, the Pope's declaration, the Model Penal Code, and the American 
Bar Association's position. He additionally finds the penological goals 
of retribution and deterrence are not supported by juvenile executions. 
He argues children deserve special treatment, analogizes juveniles to the 
insane, and asserts today's children are less mature than children at the 
tum of the century. 
Arthur J. Goldberg, A Kinder and Gentler Supreme Court, 17 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 287 (1990). 
The author discusses Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and asserts both cases were 
wrongly decided by the Supreme Court. He argues the plurality 
erroneously relied on the fact that a majority of states permitting capital 
punishment do not expressly exempt juveniles or the mentally retarded, 
and that the plurality failed to take into account the world community'S 
stance on these issues. 
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Helene B. Greenwald, Comment, Capital Punishment/or Minors: An Eighth 
Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471 (1983). 
In this conunent, the author discusses the historical treatment of minors 
at common law, the development of the juvenile justice system, and the 
present trend of transferring juveniles to criminal court. The author 
argues sentencing minors to death violates the excessiveness strand of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. She asserts the death penalty 
is always disproportionate when applied to minors, and that it fails to 
make a contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment. 
Helene B. Greenwald, Eighth Amendment - Minors and the Death Penalty: 
Decision and Avoidance, 73 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1525 (1982). 
This note discusses Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and 
chastises the Court for its improper use of judicial restraint. The author 
asserts Eddings adds nothing to death penalty jurisprudence, but merely 
applies established rules and guidelines. She argues an analysis of 
Eddings reveals the Court's abandonment of well-established procedures 
for certiorari in order to avoid the issue of juveniles and the death 
penalty. 
John 1. Gruttadaurio, Note, Consistency in the Application 0/ the Death 
Penalty to Juveniles and the Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative 
Approach, 58 U. ON. L. REv. 211 (1989). 
The author argues that the same considerations protecting juveniles from 
execution should apply to those who are functionally juveniles because 
of their mental impairment. He proposes a model statute, concluding 
there is a need for state statutes to take the issue of mental impairment 
out of aggravating-mitigating circumstances balancing and removing the 
entire class of mentally impaired from execution. 
Robert Y. Gwin, The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual Punishment When 
Imposed Upon Juveniles, Ky. BENCH & B., April. 1981, at 16. 
The article looks at the two prongs of the cruel and unusual punishments 
test and concludes the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth 
Amendment because it is unacceptable to contemporary society and it is 
excessive. 
HERBERT H. HAINES, AOAINST CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (1996). 
This book discusses the anti-death penalty movement in America from 
1972 to 1994. The author examines the efforts to develop a multi 
organizational network to attack the death penalty. He discusses the 
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involvement and conttibutions of Amnesty, International. Amnesty 
International pushed for incremental attacks on the death penalty and 
pursued studies revealing the lack of public support for executions of 
those under eighteen, those with a history of mental illness, and the 
mentally retarded. The book reports the success of legislation 
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded. 
ROBERT L. HALE, A REVIEW OF JUVENILE EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 
(Criminology Studies vol. 3, 1997). 
This study lists 330 juveniles executed in the United States. The study 
takes a functional and conflict approach and looks at how various 
characteristics of juveniles have conttibuted to the administration of the 
death penalty for this class. It also examines five different periods of 
American history where juveniles were death eligible. The author 
perfonns a historical analysis, looking at the social attitudes of the period 
regarding age, race, and gender of the defendant. 
Cele Hancock. Note, The Incompatibility of the Juvenile Death Penalty and 
the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child: Domestic and 
International Concerns, 12 ARIz. J.INT'L & COMPo L. 699 (1995). 
This note looks at the Supreme Court decisions discussing the juvenile 
death penalty. The author concludes the Court's unwillingness to find 
a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty creates a need for 
the individual states to determine their own sentences. She argues the 
United States must preserve individual state sovereignty and reserve 
disagreement to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. She urges the Court to give the states clear guidelines concerning 
the juvenile death penalty in order to contain the international 
community'S attempts to dictate United State's laws. 
Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of 
International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. 
ON. L. REv. 655 (1983). 
This is an article looking at international nonns on the execution of 
juveniles and their effect on the imposition of the juvenile death penalty 
in the United States. The author examines the theory that international 
human rights norms are a part of the federal common law. He also looks 
at the position of the United States as a dissenter to the norm. 
Additionally, he examines the theory of international norms on juvenile 
executions as incorporated into the Eighth Amendment analysis. He 
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predicts that using these theories to invalidate state statutes authorizing 
juvenile executions will encounter stiff resistance. 
Lisa Joy Harwood, Comment, Devolving Standards of Decency: The Death 
Penalty for Juveniles, 21NT'L LEGAL PERSP. 87 (1990). 
The author examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
criticizes the decision for its departure from earlier death penalty cases 
and international norms concerning human rights. She argues the issue 
of executing juveniles should be looked at in the framework of the world 
community. She points to the international community'S prohibition on 
the execution of juveniles and its movement toward total abolition of the 
death penalty. She looks at the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, and the 
Geneva Convention. She cpmpares the United States' policy on juvenile 
executions with the Soviet Union's, and finds the Soviet restrictions to 
be more enlightened than the current policies of the United States. 
David Heffernan, Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis 
of the Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CA TH. U. L. REv. 481 
(1996). 
This comment looks at how international law and the Eighth 
Amendment interrelate. The author looks at Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in general and then specifically at death penalty cases. He 
compares these interpretations to the international standard, and finds 
there is a broader scope of protection under the international standard. 
He examines the juvenile death penalty, and concludes the United States' 
reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
conflicts with the non-derogability clause. Thus, he fmds it violates an 
international norm. He concludes that the Supreme Court's narrowing 
of the Eighth Amendment means there is now little symmetry between 
the Eighth Amendment and the international standard. 
Frank W. Heft Jr., Death Penalty for Teens: Is It Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment? Yes, 75 A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 42. 
This is an excerpt from Heft's brief on behalf of Kevin Stanford in 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He argues the death penalty 
for juveniles is unconstitutional. 
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Laura Ann Herbert, The Court, Legislators, and Juvenile Capital Punishment 
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Mississippi) (on file 
with the University of Mississippi Library). 
This dissertation looks at Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); and at the perspectives often 
state legislatures. Based on survey responses, the author constructs three 
models. Model One looks at Which variables predict legislator's attitudes 
toward juvenile capital punishment. Model Two looks at which variables 
predict legislator's attitudes toward Supreme Court decisions. Model 
Three looks at variables to determine which legislators are more likely 
to know their state laws. In Model One, the state, gender, political 
ideology, and attitude toward adult capital punishment were significant 
variables. In Model Two, race was a significant variable. In Model 
Three, a majority of legislators were not aware of their own state laws. 
Significant variables for Model Three included state, criminal justice 
experience, and general attitude toward capital punishment. 
Christopher M. Hill, Can the Death Penalty Be Imposed on Juveniles: The 
Unanswered Question in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1984). 
This article discusses the juvenile death penalty in light of Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and other Eighth Amendment cases. 
The author examines public, legislative, judicial, and international 
attitudes towardjuvenile executions. He concludes these attitudes do not 
rise to the level of widespread rejection. He discusses death penalty 
jurisprudence and the Eighth Amendment tests, and then analyzes the 
treatment of the juvenile offender in general. He asserts the judicial 
waiver system is unreliable and should not be considered proof that a 
juvenile should be treated as an adult for sentencing purposes. He 
concludes the time is not ripe for a judicial ruling prohibiting the juvenile 
death penalty. 
Shannon Hill, United States: A World Leader in Executing Juveniles, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH CHll..DREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, Mar. 1995, at 1. 
Human Rights Watch is an organization which opposes the death penalty 
on all grounds. This report condemns the juvenile death penalty. The 
report examines Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the current status 
of death penalty statutes. The report asserts the United States is bound 
as a signatory not to act in a manner defeating the purpose of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
thus should not execute juveniles. The report also concludes the United 
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States violates customary intemationallaw when it executes juveniles. 
The report examines the characteristics of juveniles sentenced to death 
and finds many of them suffer from inadequate legal representation and 
come from abusive backgrounds. The report looks at eight individual 
cases. It summarizes professional and legal views on the juvenile death 
penalty. 
Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing,' Juveniles and the Death 
Penalty, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 229 (1989). 
This article focuses exclusively on the juvenile death penalty and the 
principles of retributive justice. The author argues modem retributive 
theory demands both cardinal and ordinal proportionality, and compels 
the Supreme Court to reject a bright line ban on the juvenile death 
penalty. 
Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role in the 
Development of a Mitigation Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 767 (1987). 
The author discusses research on juvenile homicides and why juveniles 
kill. She identifies these juveniles as having suffered from intense 
emotional and physical abuse, neurological impairment, and drug abuse. 
She argues these studies onjuvenile murderers can assist defense counsel 
in understanding juvenile clients and developing mitigation arguments. 
She asserts these studies demonstrate the death penalty is 
disproportionate punishment. She urges defense counsel in juvenile 
death penalty cases to investigate family history, neurological 
impairment, and drug abuse. She uses the case of James Terry Roach to 
illustrate the failure of defense counsel to present mitigating evidence. 
ROGER HOOD, TIm DBA TH PENALTY: A WORLI>-WIDE PERSPECTIVE (1989). 
This report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control is based on a study of the death penalty. The report addresses 
the observation of standards and safeguards guaranteeing the rights of 
those facing the death penalty. The report finds twenty-six states had 
minimum death penalty ages from twelve to seventeen or no minimum 
age at all, thus violating standards for juveniles. The report examines 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989). In addition to juvenile safeguards, the report 
addresses the mentally incapacitated. It finds the federal government and 
some states have modified the insanity defense, although three states 
abolished it. Twelve states have adopted a guilty but mentally ill verdict, 
which the author believes precludes a death sentence. The report notes 
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the problem of death row inmates becoming mentally ill after trial and 
the execution of mentally retarded offenders in the United States. 
Cathleen E. Hull, Comment, "Enlightened By a Humane Justice": An 
International Law Argument Against the Juvenile Death Penalty, 47 U. KAN. 
L. REv. 1079 (1999). 
After a review of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), this article discusses the 
international law argument against the juvenile death penalty. First, the 
author looks at treaty law, specifically the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. . She concludes the United States is in violation of these 
treaties and that any reservations are invalid because they are 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaties. She also argues 
the United States has violated the customary rule of international law 
prohibiting juvenile executions. She asserts the widespread prohibition 
has evolved into an extensive and almost uniform practice, thus 
satisfying the elements of generality, consistency, and duration. She 
finds opinio juris satisfied because very few states execute juveniles. 
Lastly, she examines whether the prohibition has become jus cogens and 
concludes it has not. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF A MISSION (1996). 
This is the report of a fact finding mission of the International 
Commission of Jurists. The primary purPose of the mission was to look 
at practices and procedures in capital sentencing and examine whether 
these conformed to the international obligations of the United States. 
The report discusses several landmark decisions of the Supreme Court, 
sets out two official studies on racial disparity in capital sentencing, 
analyzes the United States ratification of several treaties, traces the 
historical background of the death penalty in the United States, and looks 
at statistical information. The appendices contain statistics and the text 
of the relevant international instruments. The Commission fmds that 
capital sentencing as currently applied is inconsistent with the 
international obligations undertaken by the United States. Among other 
things, the report discusses the issue of the juvenile death penalty. 
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Nancy A. Inskeep, Note, Death' s Foreclosure: Capital Punishment of Sixteen-
and-Seventeen-Year Olds Under Stanford v. Kentucky, 18 N. Ky. L. REv. 81 
(1990). 
This article looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
concludes contemporary standards permit the death penalty for 
aggravated murder, regardless of whether the offender is a juvenile. The 
author argues chronological age cannot excuse the defendants in Stanford 
v. Kentucky. 
Lara Intrator, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Role of International Law 
in Juvenile Death Penalty Litigation, 8 WIS.INT'LL. J. 165 (1989). 
After an overview of the history of the juvenile death penalty and the role 
of international norms in death penalty cases, the author looks at 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). She discusses the way the 
plurality, dissent, and concurrence, treat the idea of international law in 
domestic litigation. She finds that although the plurality and the dissent 
did not accept that international law was binding on the United States, 
the fact that international norms were discussed marks an awareness and 
possible willingness to accept the validity of international nonns in 
human rights issues such as the juvenile death penalty. 
Nick Jackson, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Law of Averages, 4 DET. C. 
L. REv. 999 (1988). 
This note analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The 
author asserts that the forty year base the Supreme Court chose to 
examine for capital punishment statistics was not a long enough span of 
history to discover public attitudes toward capital punishment. He also 
argues that by picking and choosing its statistics, the Court can force a 
definition of cruel and unusual punishment that bears no relationship to 
a national consensus on the death penalty. He states the Thompson Court 
redrafted what the original framers had in mind. He foresees that as the 
Court's membership changes, the states may be given greater latitude in 
delivering death sentences. 
Sherri Jackson, Too Young to Die - Juveniles and the Death Penalty - A Better 
Alternative to Killing Our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391 (1996). 
This note argues the juvenile death penalty is cruel and unusual 
punishment and that there are better alternatives to dealing with violent 
juvenile offenders than execution. The author first explores the juvenile 
justice system and the history of the juvenile death penalty. She then 
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performs an Eighth Amendment analysis. She finds capital punishment 
of juveniles was not considered cruel and unusual by the framers. She 
does find juvenile executions unacceptable to today' s society, and comes 
to this conclusion after looking at: other legislative restrictions on 
juveniles, the rarity of death sentences, opinion polls, opinions of 
professional organizations, and views of the international community. 
She finds the punishment disproportionate to the crime because juveniles 
lack the culpability and maturity of adult offenders. She suggests 
alternatives to execution such as long term incarceration and creative 
rehabilitation programs. She proposes that the long term solution is to 
promote programs of youth empowerment. 
MARGARETC. JASPER, THE LAW OF CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (1998). 
This book on capital punishment contains chapters on legal 
representation, public opinion, costs, deterrence, erroneous convictions, 
discrimination, women, juveniles, sentence review, international opinion, 
the federal death penalty, and the history of the death penalty. The 
chapter on juveniles gives statistical information on current juveniles 
under a death sentence. It also briefly discusses the international status 
of the juvenile death penalty. 
RonaL. Just, Note, Executing Youthful Offenders: The Unanswered Question 
in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 471 (1985). 
The author looks at the juvenile death penalty and concludes it should be 
prohibited. She first looks at the theories of punishment. She finds the 
juvenile status of the offender makes punishment based on these theories 
ineffective. She then looks at the development of the juvenile court 
system and the special status afforded juveniles in our society. She 
examines death penalty jurisprudence and the rights of juveniles. After 
looking at current death penalty statutes and appellate decisions on the 
juvenile death penalty, she recommends a model amendment to death 
penalty statutes that prohibits the execution of juveniles. 
Lauren B. Kallins, Comment, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Is the United States 
in Contravention of International Law?, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 77 
(1993). 
After a brief history of the death penalty in the United States, the author 
examines the juvenile death penalty in light of international treaties and 
customary international law . The author argues customary international 
law does not obligate the United States to prohibit juvenile executions 
because the existence of a state practice proscribing execution of minors 
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cannot be established. She also argues that opinio juris does not apply 
because there has been no real evidence offered to demonstrate it exists 
as to the prohibition of juvenile executions. She also points out that the 
United States' protests against a rule prohibiting the execution of minors 
can be seen in the debates surrounding human rights treaties. She 
concludes that although the Supreme Court is unwilling to enforce 
international standards concerning the execution of juveniles, it is not 
blind to their relevance. 
Seung Oh Kang, Note, The Efficacy of Youth As a Mitigating Circumstance: 
Preservation of the Capital Defendant'S Constitutional Rights Pursuant to 
Traditional Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 747 
(1994). 
This note looks at the issue of the juvenile death penalty and concludes 
that establishing a bright line prohibition on the execution of juveniles 
would offend the dignity of man and undermine Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The author criticizes the plurality in Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989), for failing to conduct a proportionality test. He 
finds a generalized concept that juveniles are less blameworthy than 
adults who commit similar crimes, but argues a bright line exclusion 
conflicts with traditional Eighth Amendment values because it fails to 
individually examine the proportionality of the death penalty to the 
defendant's culpability and the goals of retribution and deterrence. He 
argues age should mitigate but not exempt juveniles from the death 
penalty. 
Jay Lee Kanzler Jr., Note, Wilkins v. Missouri: The Court Searches for a 
Consensus to the Cruel and Unusual Question, 35 St. Louis U. L.J. 125 
(1990). 
After an overview of recent capital punishment decisions pertinent to the 
juvenile death penalty, the case note examines Wilkins v. Missouri 
(consolidated with Stanford v. Kentucky). The author finds the Supreme 
Court split three ways in its interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause. He asserts the plurality erred when it failed to 
apply a proportionality analysis and rejected ethicoscientific data. He 
argues the dissent erred when it disregarded evidence of legislative 
enactments and jury determinations. He concludes Justice O'Connor's 
opinion to be the correct approach, looking to the individual jurisdictions 
permitting or prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. 
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Warren M. Kato, Comment, The Juvenile Death Penalty, 181. JUY. L. 112 
(1997). 
The author begins with a history of the juvenile death penalty. He 
analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and concludes 
the Court erred in drawing a bright line rule prohibiting the execution of 
juveniles younger than fifteen. He criticizes the plurality's examination 
of irrelevant age-based statutes. He asserts the plurality failed to give 
proper weight to state certification statutes. He fmds the plurality's 
analysis of legislative enactments flawed because they exclude those 
states which authorized the death penalty but did not list a minimum age. 
He concludes the plurality placed too much emphasis on an international 
consensus. He examines the plurality's determination that juveniles as 
a class are less culpable than adults and finds this conclusion too broad. 
He concludes the plurality's analysis of retribution and deterrence was 
based on the subjective feelings of the justices not on objective analysis. 
He analyzes the current make up of the Court and argues Thompson 
would be overruled if another case like it came before the Court. 
Robert Anthony Klein, Note, Juvenile Criminals and the Death Penalty: 
Resurrection of the Question Left Unanswered in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 11 
NEW ENG. 1. ON CRIM. & CIY. CONFINEMENT 437 (1985). 
In this note, the au~or looks at Trimble v. Maryland, 478 A.2d 1143 
(Md. 1984), a case in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and 
examines the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. He begins 
with a discussion of the legislative waiver process in Maryland and the 
Federal Youth Corrections Act. Next he addresses the death penalty in 
Maryland and its application in Trimble's case. He concludes the 
Maryland statute is flawed but constitutional. He further asserts an equal 
protection argument based on Trimble's status as a juvenile would be 
denied. Finally, he examines the Maryland court's Eighth Amendment 
analysis, He concludes the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 
Trimble implies the death penalty for juveniles is not per se 
unconstitutional. 
B.E.F. Knell, Capital Punishment: Its Administration in Relation to Juvenile 
Offenders in the Nineteenth Century and Its Possible Administration in the 
Eighteenth Century, 5 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1965). 
The author examines the common belief that children in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century were frequently executed. He concludes this 
belief is erroneous and that juveniles' were very rarely executed. For 
example, he finds 103 death sentencedjuveniles between the years 1801 
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and 1836, but notes that none of them were actually executed. He 
concludes more empirical research is needed, but argues judicial 
execution of children in the eighteenth and nineteenth century was never 
common. 
T. Shawn Lanier, Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty: An 
Analysis of Stanford v. Kentucky, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1097 (1994). 
After setting forth a brief history of the juvenile death penalty, the author 
examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He concludes the 
plurality erroneously decided the case and was inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent. He asserts the plUrality's sole reliance on 
state death penalty statutes ignores precedent, as does the refusal to 
consider international norms,jury sentencing patterns, opinion polls, and 
views of professional organizations. He finds the plurality further 
abandoned precedent when it failed to perform a proportionality analysis. 
BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT 
CASES ON CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (1998). 
This book contains excerpts of the Supreme Court opinions on the death 
penalty. It also contains a brief overview of the history of the Eighth 
Amendment, capital laws and procedures, and the capital punishment 
debate. The appendix contains facts and figures on murder and the death 
penalty. Cases discussed that are relevant to this bibliography include: 
Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399 (1986); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). 
Gina A. Leahy, Comment, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 890 (1989). 
After analyzing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the author 
of this comment concludes the decision provides necessary guidance for 
state legislatures and courts. She recognizes the broad scope of the 
decision but asserts prior case law and societal norms support the 
prohibition on executing juveniles under sixteen. 
Gregory B. Leong and Spencer Eth, Behavioral Science and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCI-nA TRY L. 301 (1989). 
The authors argue behavioral science data does not support the abolition 
of the juvenile death penalty. They assert it shows that the cogniti ve and 
moral development of adolescents is comparable to adults, and that the 
neuropsychiatric symptoms in condemned juveniles cannot be 
sufficiently distinguished from those in condemned adults. 
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Jennifer Seibring Marcotte, Comment, Death Penalty For Minors: Who 
Should Decide?, 20 S. TIl. U. L.J. 621 (1996). 
After a look at the historical application of the death penalty to juveniles, 
the author argues the Supreme Court should review its decision that 
prohibits the execution of juveniles under sixteen. She asserts crimes 
committed by juveniles are increasingly violent and sophisticated. She 
argues Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), have limited the power of state 
legislators to pass laws in the best interests of their citizens, and that the 
position assumed by the Court is improper. She concludes the age of the 
offender should be a mitigating factor rather than an absolute ban on 
executions. 
Rodger A. Maynes, Comment, The Death Penalty For Juveniles - A 
Constitutional Alternative, 7 J. Juv. L. 54 (1983). 
This comment argues the juvenile death penalty is a constitutional and 
effecti ve means for protecting society from hard-core juvenile offenders. 
The author asserts the juvenile justice system fails when confronted with 
juveniles who are experienced, sophisticated, and rehabilitative failures. 
He argues the solution to the problem is the transfer of juveniles to adult 
court where they may be subjected to the death penalty. He asserts that 
the fact that juvenile offenders have been sentenced to death in the past 
proves the execution of juveniles is not repugna!lt to the evolving 
standards of decency. He argues age is not conclusive of a person's 
maturity or criminal intent. 
Maria P. Menard, Note, Procedural Due Process For Juveniles on Death 
Row: A Matter of Life and Death, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 943 (1988-1989). 
The author of this note examines the problems inherent in the current 
methods for transferring juvenile offenders to adult courts and the 
constitutionality of subjecting j uveniles to the death penalty. She argues 
that because juveniles transferred to adult courts are subjected to adult 
penalties, but lack procedural due process protections, it is 
unconstitutional to execute them. She asserts it is contrary to the 
philosophy behind the juvenile court system. She proposes that the due 
process requirement of a hearing, an attorney, and a right to counsel be 
applied to all juvenile transfer methods. She further argues the death 
penalty as applied to juveniles is unconstitutional because: there is a 
national consensus against juvenile executions, minors are in need of 
special consideration and protection, and the juvenile death penalty fails 
to serve the penological goals of deterrence and retribution. 
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Edward Miller, Note, Executing Minors and the Mentally Retarded: The 
Retribution and Deterrence Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 15 (1990). 
This note looks atStanJordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and concludes the Supreme Court erred 
in its assessment of the deterrent and retributive values of sentencing to 
death juveniles and the mentally retarded. The author gives a 
background of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the 
evolution of the deterrent and retributive analysis. He criticizes Justices 
O'Connor and Scalia for abandoning the penological purpose test in 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He looks at Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and argues Justice O'Connor distorts the 
penological purpose test. The author then performs his own analysis and 
finds that the characteristics of juveniles and the mentally retarded 
preclude the required level of culpability necessary for the death penalty. 
He argues this lesser CUlpability does not fulfill the goal of retribution. 
He also argues that the poor impulse control, lack of strategic thinking, 
and difficulty seeing their mortality means it is unlikely the goal of 
deterrence is served by executing juveniles and the mentally retarded. 
SalvatoreJ. Modica,New York's Death Penalty: The Age Requirement, 13 ST. 
JOHN'S 1. LEGAL COMMENT. 585 (1999). 
The author examines the New York death penalty statute requirement 
that the defendant be "more than eighteen years old" and concludes the 
language means it applies to defendants as of the date of their eighteenth 
birthday. In the course of his analysis, the author concludes the phrase 
is ambiguous and the legislative intent cannot be read on the plain face 
of the statute. By looking at previous New York death penalty statutes, 
statutes with similar age based language, and at New York case law, he 
concludes the legislative intent was to include defendants eighteen and 
older at the time the crime was committed. 
Etta 1. Mullin, Note, At What Age Should They Die? The United States 
Supreme Court Decision With Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death 
Penalty, 16 T. MARSHALLL. REv. 161 (1990). 
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
concludes juveniles should not be executed because they are not as 
culpable as adults. After an overview of juvenile justice and the juvenile 
death penalty, the author analyzes Stanford. She argues the evolving 
standards of decency analysis is too difficult to define. She asserts 
statistics can be manipulated to come to different conclusions and that 
legislative trends and public opinion are too uncertain. She proposes the 
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better approach is the proportionality analysis. She argues the juvenile 
death penalty is always disproportionate because juvenile offenders are 
always less culpable than adults. 
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FuND, DEATH Row U.S.A. (2000). 
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Defense Fund publishes a 
quarterly report on death row statistics and cases. The statistics 
compiled include the number and percentage of juveniles on death row. 
The report includes summaries of significant criminal, habeas, and 
constitutional cases. The report also compiles statistics on those 
executed and contains state lists of prisoners on death row. The state 
lists identify juveniles. 
Gino J. Naldi, The U.S. Supreme Court, the Execution of Juveniles and 
Human Rights, 19 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 345 (1990). 
This article examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
concludes the decision was incompatible with human rights standards. 
The author looks at international instruments such as the Geneva 
Convention, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. He concludes the United States 
is not per se bound by these treaties, but he argues a norm of customary 
international law prohibiting juvenile executions exists and is binding on 
the United States He also argues the prohibition of juvenile executions 
may be jus cogens. 
Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty 
For Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAULL. REv. 1311 (1993). 
After an overview of United States death penalty jurisprudence, the 
author examines the emerging international standards on the execution 
of juveniles. The author looks at the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Geneva Convention, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and U.N. resolutions. The article argues that at the time many of 
these treaties were adopted, the United States had discontinued juvenile 
executions and therefore any reservation to these agreements is 
ineffective. The author also looks at the number of countries that have 
abolished the juvenile death penalty and fmds a consensus that 
international law prohibits juvenile executions. She urges the United 
States Senate to withdraw its reservation or alternatively that the 
Supreme Court hold the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth 
Amendment. 
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National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Stop Killing Kids, at 
http://www.ncadp.orglskkmenu.html (last visited Oct. 1,2000). 
This Web site is by a coalition of organizations and individuals trying to 
abolish the death penalty. The Stop Killing Kids is a smaller site within 
the larger more general anti-death penalty site. The National Coalition 
to Abolish the Death Penalty (NCADP) states our national failure to 
nurture and protect our children can be seen in every child on death row. 
It decries the political reaction of lowering the age for the death penalty 
instead of trying to remedy youth violence. It also points out the pattern 
of racial discrimination in choosing which juveniles are sentenced to 
death row. It asserts the United States commits human rights violations 
each time it sentences a child todeath. The site seeks to build an alliance 
of groups and individuals to oppose the execution of juveniles. It 
highlight~ particular cases. 
Kha Q. Nguyen, Note, In Defense of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the 
Capital Punishment of Juveniles in the United States, 28 GEO. WASH. J .INT'L 
L. & BeON. 401 (1995). 
The author argues capital punishment of juveniles violates a norm of 
international law. The author first discusses the capital punishment of 
juveniles by examining Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), 
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author next defines 
jus cogens. The author analyzes the law and practice of other nations, 
international agreements, and decisions of international judicial bodies, 
and concludes the exclusion of juveniles from capital punishment is ajus 
cogens norm. The author concludes it is unlikely United States courts 
would enforce a jus cog ens norm but sees it being incorporated into the 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as part of the "evolving standards of 
decency" analysis and as part of the proportionality strand. 
Julian S. Nicholls, Comment, Too Young to Die: International Law and the 
Imposition of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States, 5 EMORY INT'L 
L. REv. 617 (1991). 
After an examination of death penalty jurisprudence and the juvenile 
death penalty's history, the author looks at international practice and 
opinion. The author argues the international protests against the United 
States juvenile death penalty, the fact that most countries ban the 
execution of juveniles, human rights treaties, and U.N. resolutions, 
demonstrate an international consensus against the juvenile death 
penalty. The author sees the above as evidence of a norm of customary 
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international law and argues that because the United States has failed to 
dissent from the ban on the execution of juveniles from the beginning, it 
does not qualify as a persistent dissenter. The author also argues the 
prohibition on juvenile executions is jus cogens and binding on the 
United States. 
Jeff Noble, Note, 40 Drake L. Rev. 195 (1991). 
This case note examines Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
The author concludes the case sets a bright line rule that executing 
fifteen-year-olds violates the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual 
punishments clause. He predicts that the constitutionality of the death 
penalty for sixteen-and-seventeen-year-olds, will tum on whether the 
state statute authorizing the death penalty includes a specific minimum 
age. 
Teresa L. Norris, Juvenile Executions: The United States' Violation of 
International Law (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University 
of South Carolina Law Library). 
This manuscript examines the juvenile death penalty in light of 
international law and concludes the United States violates the human 
rights of juvenile offenders by imposing capital sentences. After a 
background on the juvenile death penalty in the United States, the author 
looks at the major human rights treaties abolishing juvenile executions. 
Although she finds the United States has not ratified any agreement 
expressly prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, such a prohibition may 
be enforced domestically because it is a customary international norm. 
The author examines the proposition that the prohibition on juvenile 
executions rises to the level of jus cogens, and concludes it does not. She 
does, however, find it is a customary international norm. In addition to 
treaty evidence, she notes evidence that the majority of states do not 
execute juveniles. She concludes the United States did not protest the 
norm during its formation and is thus not exempt. 
MARGARET OBERST, ClflLDREN ON DEATH Row: THE FATE OF JUVENILE 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (1987). 
This report is designed to give background information on juvenile 
capital punishment and was compiled for the Council of State 
Governments. It briefly summarizes the arguments on both sides of the 
issues. It sets forth the state minimum ages for imposition of the death 
penalty and gives statistics on the number of juveniles on death row and 
executed. 
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James R.P. Ogloff, The Juvenile Death Penalty: A Frustrated Society's 
Attempt for Control, 5 BEHA V. SCI. & L. 447 (1987). 
This author looks at the juvenile death penalty and concludes it serves 
very little logical purpose. He looks at juveniles currently on death row 
and notes that in the majority of cases, the murder occurred during a 
felony. He urges that empirical research is needed to specifically 
evaluate a juvenile'S decision making ability during the commission of 
a felony in order to help detennine their legal responsibility. He 
questions the logic of executing a juvenile for a murder he or she may not 
have intended. The author considers the various theories of punishment 
and concludes less extreme methods of punishment would satisfy those 
goals. He questions how the felony-murder ratio affects deterrence and 
retribution. 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991). 
This book on the death penalty is divided into five parts. Part I gives an 
overview of capital punishment. Part II discusses the legal challenges to 
the death penalty pre-Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and 
discusses legal challenges and reform of the death penalty after Gregg v. 
Georgia. This part addresses mitigation evidence such as youth or 
mental illness. This part also examines the execution of special groups 
such as the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. The Supreme 
Court cases of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988); and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), are discussed. 
Part m deals with racial discrimination and arbitrariness. Part IV 
discusses arguments for and against the death penalty. Part V looks at 
alternatives to capital punishment. 
Dan Peelman, Note, Insight Toward Juvenile Death Penalty, 11 J. Juv. L. 78 
(1990). 
This note looks at Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), tracing the principles 
developed in those two cases in order to gain insight into the Court's 
decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and the 
prohibition on executing minors under sixteen. 
Dan Peelman, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Juvenile Death Penalty Insight 
and Analysis, 11 J. Juv. L. 33 (1990). 
After giving a very brief historical overview of the treatment of juvenile 
offenders in the justice system, the author analyzes Thompson v. 
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Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). He concludes by summarizing the 
Court's findings. 
Tanya M. Perfecky, Note, Children, the Death Penalty and the Eighth 
Amendment: An Analysis of Stanford v. Kentucky, 35 VILL. L. REv. 641 
(1990). 
This note examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The 
author asserts the plurality erred in failing to apply an excessiveness 
analysis. The note discusses the two-prong test developed in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and its application to juveniles. She 
argues the Stanford plurality also improperly rejected consideration of 
jury sentences and international norms when it examined the evolving 
standards of decency. 
Arthur E. Peterson, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Mitigating 
Circumstances of Youthful Capital Offenders, 25 TULSA L.J. 115 (1989). 
The author looks at Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and 
concludes the Court should allow the states to establish procedures where 
youth is a mitigating factor. He argues objective indicators of a national 
consensus are inconclusive. He asserts the Thompson plurality failed to 
address the collective victim when it determined the evolving standards 
of decency. He argues establishing a minimum age for capital 
punishment runs counter to Supreme Court policy towards minors. He 
finds an age-based death penalty statute arbitrary and unjust, and asserts 
the sentencer must focus on the juvenile's thought process. He urges 
states to refine their death penalty statutes and sentencing procedures. 
Charles A. Polen, Comment, Youth on Death Row: Waiver of Juvenile Court 
Jurisdiction and Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juvenile Offenders, 13 N. 
Ky. L. REv. 495 (1987). 
This article discusses the juvenile court system and the transfer of 
juveniles to adult criminal courts where they are subject to the death 
penalty. The author asserts the juvenile justice system fails in 
rehabilitating hard-core juvenile offenders, so transfer to adult courts is 
necessary. He cautions, however, that transfer should not be done lightly 
and that the waiving body should be given specific criteria to consider 
when making that decision. He notes few death penalty statutes exempt 
juveniles from execution, and he looks at the trend in state courts toward 
allowing juvenile executions. He asserts that while age must be 
considered a mitigating factor, it can be easily overcome by aggravating 
circumstances. He looks at the justifications for capital punishment and 
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concludes that retribution may apply to juvenile cases, but finds other 
justifications questionable. 
BARRETI PRETTYMAN, JR., DEATH AND TIIE SUPREME COURT (1961). 
This book is an account of six death penalty cases that went before the 
Supreme Court. One of the cases discussed is that of Willie Francis, an 
African-Americanjuvenile sentenced to death for a crime that took place 
when he was fifteen. Louisiana's first attempt at electrocution failed and 
his case eventually reached the Supreme Court. He was seventeen when 
his death sentence was finally carried out. 
Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The U.S. Constitution. the Supreme Court and 
Capital Punishment: Should the U.S.A. Put the Death Penalty to Death?, 50 
N.IR. LEGALQ. 50 (1999). 
This article gives an overview of important death penalty cases. In 
particular it discusses Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 US. 815 (1988), 
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), concerning juveniles; 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), concerning the insane; and 
. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 392 (1989), concerning the mentally 
retarded. 
Paul Reidinger, The Death Row Kids, 75 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 78. 
The author discusses the Supreme Court's splintered record on juvenile 
death penalty cases, taking a close look at Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). He sets 
forth the facts and arguments in the Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989), briefs. He also reports the views of experts on the juvenile death 
penalty. 
Paul Reidinger, Fate of the Teenage Killers, 73 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1987, at 88. 
The article summarizes the facts and arguments in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815 (1988), compares it to Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104 (1982), and analyzes the Supreme Court Justices' voting 
records on death penalty cases for the year. 
Dominic J. Ricotta, Supreme Court Review, The Death Penalty for Juveniles: 
A State's Right or a Child's Injustice?, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921 
(1988). 
This case note analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 US. 815 (1988), 
and concludes it was a positive development in juvenile justice. The 
author comes to the conclusion that the Court needs to focus more on 
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capacity, proportionality, and justice in its Eighth Amendment analysis 
than on standards of justice. 
Jeffrey L. Robinette, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky: Upholding Juvenile Capital 
Punishment -A Confirmation of Society 's "Evolving Standards of Decency "?, 
92 W. VA. L. REv. 205 (1989). 
After looking at the juvenile court system and Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the author examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989). He argues the plurality interpreted objective data in a subjective 
manner and so failed to reflect contemporary society's values. He asserts 
Justice O'Connor's opinion was inconsistent with her holding in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and that had she been 
consistent, the Stanford decision would have been reversed. 
Dinah A. Robinson and Otis H. Stephens, Patterns of Mitigating Factors in 
Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 246 (1992). 
This article looks at mitigating factors present in juvenile death penalty 
cases. The authors studied ninety-one juvenile death penalty cases. 
Some of the factors identified were: troubled family history and social 
background, psychological disturbance, mental retardation, indigence, 
and substance abuse. The authors argue the legal process did not ensure 
adequate consideration of mitigating factors. They assert the Eighth 
Amendment requires more than deference to legislative majorities. They 
find no convincing rationale to assert the Eighth Amendment allows the 
execution of sixteen-and-seventeen-year-olds. 
Morna L. Bowman Rouse, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: A Special Place in 
Society For Juveniles; Does It Include Death Row?, 9 CRIM. JUST. 1. 371 
(1987). 
The author begins by discussing the two prong test for determining the 
constitutionality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment and 
then moves on to the facts of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988). She concludes by offering three alternative possible rulings: 
prohibition of executing those under eighteen, prohibition of executing 
those under sixteen, or a sentence of death but a re-evaluation of 
juveniles when they reach eighteen to decide if the death sentence is 
appropriate under the individual circumstances. 
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WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLmON OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993). 
This study analyzes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, international 
humanitarian law, the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
Geneva Convention, and other international law instruments. The author 
discusses the emergence of customary norms prohibiting the death 
penalty. He traces the development of the exclusion of certain categories 
of persons from the death penalty. In particular, he looks at the exclusion 
of juveniles and the insane. He predicts the prohibition of the death 
penalty per se will be a customary international norm and jus cogens in 
the future. 
Steven M. Scott, Note, Evolving Standards of Decency and the Death Penalty 
For Juvenile Offenders: The Contradictions Presented by Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 851 (1990). 
The author examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
concludes the plurality erred when it determined there is no national 
consensus against the juvenile death penalty. He begins with a 
background on juvenile executions and the juvenile justice system He 
then analyzes Stanford, taking issue with the plurality's exclusion of the 
fifteen jurisdictions banning the death penalty. He argues the Court must 
include all laws, not just those fitting a personal formula. After looking 
at the states banning juvenile executions, states not actively executing 
juveniles, the legislative trend toward prohibiting juvenile executions, 
and jury reluctance to sentence juveniles to death, the author finds a 
national consensus exists against the juvenile death penalty. He 
criticizes the plurality for failing to discuss the Equal Protection Clause 
and argues executing juveniles serves neither deterrence nor retribution. 
Edward F. Sherman, Jr., Note, The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the 
Limitations of the Flexible System Gove~ing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. 
INT'LL.J. 69 (1994). 
This note looks at the United States' reservation to the prohibition on 
executing juveniles in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). The author looks at the compatibility principle of treaty 
ratification in the context of the United States' reservation. He notes the 
Vienna Convention prohibits reservations incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty and thus, he finds the United States' reservation 
unacceptable. He examines the flexible system of treaty formation and 
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notes the ability of powerful signatories to make excessively broad 
reservations. He also looks at customary international law. He asserts 
there is arguably a customary international law prohibition on executing 
juveniles, but concedes the United States qualifies as a persistent 
objector. However, he concludes the United States' reservation to the 
treaty is void because it is incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the ICCPR. He proposes several changes to the Vienna Convention in 
an effort to end excessively broad reservations and to clarify when 
reservations are incompatible. 
Susan M. Simmons; Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Debating the 
Constitutionality of Juvenile Executions, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 737 (1989). 
This case note outlines the history of recent judicial decisions concerning 
capital punishment, analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988), and examines its future impact on juvenile executions. The 
author concludes that future execution of juveniles under sixteen is 
inevitable. 
Sandra Evans Skovron et al., The Death Penalty for Juveniles: An Assessment 
of Public Support, 35 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 546 (1989). 
The authors report findings from surveys of Cincinnati and Columbus, 
Ohio that concern the juvenile death penalty. Three hundred adults from 
each city were surveyed. In Cincinnati, 69% opposed legislation 
allowing juveniles over fourteen to be executed, and in Columbus, 
65.3%. The authors analyzed the survey respondents' demographic and 
attitudinal characteristics. Respondents who believed in the 
effectiveness of rehabilitation programs were less likely to support the 
juvenile death penalty. Men were more likely than women to support it. 
The authors conclude legislators overestimate the support for harsh 
penalties. 
David Smith, Death Penalty for Teens: Is it Cruel and Unusual Punishment? 
No, 75 A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 43. 
This is an excerpt from Smith's brief on behalf of the state of Kentucky 
in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He argues that imposition 
of the death penalty on juveniles does not violate the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause. 
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Tracy L. Snell, U.S. Dep't. Of Justice, Capital Punishment 1998 (1999), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov:80Ibjs/abstract/cp98.htm (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2(00). 
This is an annual report issued by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The 
report covers characteristics of persons executed and persons under a 
sentence of death. In particular, the report covers the minimum age in 
death penalty statutes, ages of defendants at the time of arrest, and ages 
of defendants under a sentence of death. 
Michael J. Spillane, Note, The Execution of Juvenile Offenders: Constitutional 
and International Law Objections, 60 UMKCL. REv. 113 (1991). 
After reviewing the history of juvenile executions, the author analyzes 
the juvenile death penalty in light of the Eighth Amendment, Equal 
Protection Clause, substantive due process, and customary international 
law .. He concludes executing minors violates the Eighth Amendment 
because the juvenile death penalty does not fit within the evolving 
standards of decency. He concludes the juvenile death penalty violates 
the Equal Protection Clause because the execution of sixteen-and-
seventeen-year-olds is not rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose of deterrence or retribution. He concludes the juvenile death 
penalty violates substantive due process because the type of offenders 
selected for execution, combined with the methods of execution, shock 
the conscience and are offensive to a sense of justice. He argues the 
general practice of most nations prohibits the execution of juveniles, the 
practice is accepted as required by law, and the United States has not 
persistently or unambiguously objected to a ban on juvenile executions. 
Thus, he concludes, the prohibition against executing juveniles is 
customary international law and binding on the states. Furthermore, he 
concludes the ban on executing juveniles is jus cogens and so basic that 
no state is permitted to deviate from that principle. 
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, Defending Categorical Exemptions to the 
Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA's Resolutions Concerning the 
Execution of Juveniles and Persons With Mental Retardation, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998 at 89. 
In this article the authors argue juveniles and the mentally retarded 
should be exempted from the death penalty. They discuss Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the weaknesses of the proportionality 
analysis. They argue the American Bar Association and others seeking 
to ban executions of juveniles and the mentally retarded, should focus 
their arguments on the following doctrinal requirements: narrowing the 
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class eligible, channeling the discretion of capital sentencers, ensuring 
the consideration of mitigating factors, and securing heightened 
reliability. 
Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the 
Child?, 26 Loy. u. em. LJ. 147 (1995). 
After giving an overview of the history of the juvenile death penalty and 
the legal background of its constitutionality battles, the author discusses 
traditional criticisms of the juvenile death penalty. She then focuses on 
the state's duty to protect children. She identifies three absolutes 
distilled from non-capital areas of juvenile law, and concludes the state's 
role as parens patriae conflicts with any imposition of the juvenile death 
penalty. She proposes the states and the Supreme Court use the best 
interests of the child standard in juvenile capital cases. 
Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment of Children in Ohio: "They'd Never 
Send a Boy of Seventeen to the Chair In Ohio, Would They?", 18 AKRONL. 
REv. 51 (1984). 
This article is by Victor Streib, an expert in the area of the juvenile death 
penalty. He begins with an overview of the evolution of capital 
punishment and the development of the juvenile justice system. He then 
focuses on Ohio's history of juvenile executions, looking at each of the 
nineteen cases individually. He compares the Ohio cases with 
nationwide cases and applauds Ohio's decision to prohibit juvenile 
executions. He concludes by urging other states to prohibit juvenile 
executions. 
VICTOR L. STREIB, DBA TH PENAL IT FOR JuVENILES (1987). 
This book is an in-depth study of the juvenile death penalty. The author 
begins by looking at the juvenile justice system, the waiver of juveniles 
into adult criminal court, and the constitutionality of juvenile executions. 
He concludes the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for 
juveniles and that eighteen should be the cut-off. He explores state laws, 
focusing on those statutes in death penalty jurisdictions. He discusses 
actual executions and then looks at the characteristics of the crimes, 
offenders, and victims. He examines a number of cases in depth. He 
then analyzes the evolution of juvenile executions in Ohio. In the last 
section of the book, the author addresses the future of the juvenile death 
penalty. He suggests criteria for future decisions concerning the juvenile 
death penalty. 
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Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and 
Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 - June 30, 2000, at 
http://www.law.onu.edulfaculty/streib/juvdeath.htm(June 30, 2000) (on file 
with the author). 
This report gives the characteristics of juvenile offenders who have been 
executed or are on death row. The author cautions that juvenile 
execution data is complete; however, the juvenile sentencing data and 
data for juvenile offenders currently on death row may be incomplete. 
The tables and appendix offer such information as name, execution, race, 
crime, place, minimum death penalty ages by jurisdiction, state by state 
breakdowns of juvenile death sentences, death sentences imposed, 
characteristics of offenders and victims, and case summaries. The author 
also comments on the historical background of the juvenile death 
penalty, legal context, juvenile death penalty in other countries, and 
rationales for and against the juvenile death penalty. This report is 
available only on the Internet and the author updates it regularly. 
Victor L. Streib, Juveniles on Death Row, reprinted in YOUNG BLOOD 167 
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995). 
The author looks at juveniles on death row and discusses their abusive 
backgrounds and poor representation by counsel. He examines the case 
of Charles Rumbaugh. He points to the trend toward excluding juveniles 
from the death penalty. He asserts alternative solutions to juvenile 
violence are needed, such as long-term prison sentences. 
Victor L. Streib, Excluding Juveniles From New York's Impendent Death 
Penalty, 54 ALBANYL. REv. 625 (1990). 
The author looks at the national history of the death penalty and provides 
tables of ·information on the executions of juvenile offenders. He 
examines New York's history of using the death penalty and looks at five 
New York juvenile executions. He asserts capital punishment for 
juveniles has been historically rare in the United States and argues the 
majority of states prohibit them. He discusses jury sentencing patterns 
and points out their rarity. He notes that leaders of legal, criminological, 
and social policy are opposed to the juvenile death penalty. He argues 
executing juveniles does not support the penological goals of retribution 
and deterrence. After analyzing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988), and Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), he critiques their 
analytical schemes. He suggests that New York consider alternatives to 
execution and concludes that if New York is going to impose the death 
penalty, it should establish a minimum age of eighteen. 
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Victor L. Streib and Lynn Sarnetz, Executing Female Juveniles, 22 CONN. L. 
REv. 3 (1989). 
The authors focus on female juveniles and capital punishment, and 
conclude that ending the death penalty for all juveniles is the only 
rational response to the phenomenon of society's extreme reluctance to 
execute female juveniles. They look at Uniform Crime Report studies 
and find that over 99% of the juvenile females exposed to the possibility 
of death were not sentenced to death. They provide information on the 
ten executed female juveniles and look at the individual cases of each of 
these girls. The authors argue there is a gender bias against men, not 
women, and that a more effective constitutional challenge to the death 
penalty for women is their status as juveniles. The authors attribute 
gender bias to the fact that mitigating factors tend to match the female 
juvenile's crime, while aggravating factors work against male juvenile 
offenders. They also acknowledge the ingrained cultural tendency to be 
more lenient with female offenders. They conclude the death penalty for 
female juveniles has been effectively prohibited due to the reluctance to 
impose death on female juveniles. 
Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Second Class 
Citizens in Capital Punishment, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PuNISHMENT 201 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998). 
This chapter looks at three frequently excluded classes from capital 
punishment: women, children, and the mentally retarded. The author 
examines the social policies and realities behind the reluctance to 
execute people in these groups. As part of his analysis, the author gives 
statistics on members of each group on death row or executed. He also 
gives historical backgrounds. The policies he looks at are culpability, 
legislative enactments, jury sentences, public opinion polls, and the 
penological goals of incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution. He 
concludes that the reasons for screening out juveniles and the mentally 
retarded are more justifiable than those for women. 
Victor L. Streib, Imposing the Death Penalty on Children, in CHALLENGING 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 245 (Kenneth C. Haas and James A. Inciardi eds., 
1988). 
This chapter looks at the juvenile death penalty and condemns it. The 
author examines waiver into adult criminal court and briefly summarizes 
the Supreme Court cases Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek 
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); and 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). He also looks at state death 
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penalty statutes and their minimum ages. He argues the punishment 
justifications of deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 
are not applicable for juveniles in death penalty situations due to the 
characteristics of juveniles. He asserts a bright line must be drawn and 
urges that line to be set at age eighteen. He gives a historical and present 
day analysis of juveniles under a sentence of death or executed. He 
concludes by suggesting alternative solutions to the problem of juvenile 
violence. 
Victor L. Streib, Juveniles' Attitudes Toward Their Impending Executions, in 
FACING TIlE DEATH PENALTY 38 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989). 
In this chapter, the author examines juvenile responses to death 
sentences. He begins with a history of the juvenile death penalty in the 
United States and a summary of recent juvenile death sentences. Thirty-
four juvenile death penalty cases were studied and six categories of 
responses were distilled from these cases: indifference, resignation, fear 
and abandonment, religious conversion, pride and defiance, and 
penitence and acceptance. He uses individual cases to illustrate these 
categories. 
Victor L. Streib. Moratorium On the Death Penalty For Juveniles, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1998, at 55. 
This article looks at the American Bar Association's proposed 
moratorium on the death penalty and considers the appropriateness of a 
moratorium on the juvenile death penalty. The author offers a history of 
the juvenile death penalty and looks at death penalty statutes. He 
provides tables with information concerning death penalty age limits, 
juvenile executions, and characteristics of offenders. He suggests a 
better alternative to the juvenile death penalty would be incarceration for 
twenty-five years with possibility of parole, or working with 
communities to prevent juvenile crime. The author's appendix includes 
juvenile death sentences imposed from Jan. 1, 1973 to June I, 1989, and 
case summaries for current juvenile death row inmates. 
Victor L. Streib, Sentencing Juvenile Murderers,' Punish the Last Offender or 
Save the Next Victim, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 765 (1995). 
This article is an edited version of the 1995 Juvenile Law Symposium 
lecture given by Victor L. Streib. The article begins with a discussion of 
juvenile crime and the American fascination with violence. The speaker 
then discusses nonrational reactions to juvenile homicide, such as the 
juvenile death penalty, the tough on crime approach, and the focus on 
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retribution. He asserts rational reactions and solutions should come from 
careful research and an increase in resources to fight the problem. He 
argues the juvenile death penalty and other draconian punishments 
should be rejected. He points to youthfulness and immaturity as 
mitigating factors. He suggests the focus be on reform and rehabilitation. 
The article concludes with a question and answer session. 
Michael D. Strugatz, Comment, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 237 (1990). 
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and 
concludes the Court correctly refused to prohibit executions of sixteen-
and-seventeen-year-olds. The author asserts the Court correctly relied on 
only objective indicia when looking at the evolving standards of decency. 
He argues the defendants could only offer speculative and incalculable 
data. 
ROBERT H. THOMAS AND JOHN D. HUTCHESON, JR., GEORGIA REsIDENTS' 
ATTITUDES TOWARD TIIE DEATH PENALTY, TIIE DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS, AND RELATED isSUES (1986). 
This report provides the findings of a sample of over 900 Georgia 
residents. Forty-one questions were asked concerning: the crime rate and 
judicial system; imprisonment and the death penalty; judicial process, 
imprisonment, and the death penalty for juvenile offenders; fairness of 
the death penalty; and alternatives to the death penalty. The relevant 
responses were as follows: 75% of the respondents believe there was an 
increase in juvenile crime; 75% are in favor of the death penalty, 
however, respondents split when asked whether juveniles and adults 
should get the same punishment; 48% thinkjuveniles should not get the 
death penalty; 27% stated it depended on the situation; 66% believe the 
mentally retarded should not receive the death penalty. 
University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center, Focus On the Death Penalty, 
at http://www.uaa.alaska.eduljustldeathlissues.html (last visited Oct. 1,2000). 
This Web site attempts to provide links to resources from both sides of 
the death penalty debate. This particular area of the site addresses 
specific issues. In addition to information on deterrence; retribution and 
justice for murder victims; the innocent; limiting appeals and habeas 
corpus reform; costs of the death penalty; alternative sentencing; 
fairness; moratorium; cruel and unusual punishment; and women, the site 
provides links to statistical information and cases concerning juveniles, 
the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill. 
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Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: 
Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. LJ. 757 
(1986). 
This note contains an Eighth Amendment analysis of the juvenile death 
penalty. The author concludes that treating age as a mitigating factor is 
insufficient to guarantee the constitutionality of the juvenile death 
penalty, and that the death penalty is always inappropriate for juveniles. 
Kathleen M. Walker, Note, The Bright Line Has Been Drawn For Juvenile 
Executions: Thompson v. Oklahoma, 23 CREIGHTONL.REv. 69 (1989/1990). 
This note offers a review of juvenile executions and Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence before analyzing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988). After examining the case, the author concludes the application 
and conclusion of the three-part Eighth Amendment test was flawed. She 
argues the dissent's analysis should have prevailed. She criticizes the 
plurality for ignoring the possibility that the federal government and nine 
states, which had no minimum age for execution, had intended juveniles 
transferred to adult court to be eligible for the death penalty. The author 
also asserts the plurality erred when it assumed a jury's reluctance to 
impose the death penalty on juveniles was an indication of the evolving 
standards of decency. She argues the plurality should have treated age 
as a mitigating factor rather than drawing a bright line. 
William M. White Jr., Case Comment, Eddings v. Oklahoma: A Stay of 
Executionfor Juveniles?, 9 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & avo CONFINEMENT 407 
(1983). 
This case comment examines Eddings V. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
(1982). The author views the case as clarifying the mitigation language 
in Locken V. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), but failing to address the issue 
of whether juveniles should be put to death. The author looks at the 
issue through such considerations as suspect classification, right to life, 
due process, the juvenile justice system, retribution, and rehabilitation. 
The comment concludes juveniles should not be executed under any 
circumstances. 
William Wilson, Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment or Firm Discipline For the Hopelessly Delinquent?, 35 
U. FLA. L. REv. 344 (1983). 
This note examines the constitutionality of juvenile executions. The 
author begins by discussing juvenile waiver mechanisms. He asserts the 
procedural safeguards invoked in judicial waiver, along with the 
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criticism of the lack of safeguards in legislative and prosecutorial waiver, 
demonstrate societal rejection of adult punishment for juveniles. He 
performs an Eighth Amendment analysis and concludes that public 
opinion, as evinced through the establishment of the juvenile justice 
system, jury reluctance to impose death sentences on juveniles, and state 
statutes, rejects the execution of juveniles. He also looks at judicial 
attitudes and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), finding both 
imply a rejection of capital punishment for minors. Finally, the author 
looks to the deterrent effect and retributive value of juvenile executions 
and concludes neither justifies the juvenile death penalty. 
Alisa Winders, State v. Shaw: The Status of Juvenile Executions, 10 AM. J. 
TRiALADvoc. 171 (1986). 
In this article, the author uses State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 1979), 
to illustrate how juvenile murderers are processed through adult courts. 
She notes the only time James Terry Roach's age came up was during the 
penalty phase of his trial. She examines the constitutionality of juvenile 
capital punishment. She reports both sides of the arguments on the 
juvenile death penalty. She concludes juveniles should not be executed 
until the Supreme Court makes a final determination on the 
constitutionality of juvenile executions. 
Lisa J.S. Wright, Killing Children: Juveniles and the Death Penalty (1996) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Southwest Texas State University)( on file with the 
Southwest Texas State University Library). 
This thesis looks at the purpose, theories, and application of the death 
penalty to juveniles. The author explores arguments for and against 
executing j uveniles. She closely examines United States Supreme Court 
death penalty decisions and the history of juvenile executions. She looks 
at the juvenile justice system and waiver into adult criminal court. She 
argues that juveniles in death eligible cases should be given individual 
consideration but should not be given a blanket exemption from the death 
penalty. 
YOUNG BLOOD: JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THE DEA THPENALTY (SmRLEYDICKS 
ED., 1995). 
Shirley Dicks, editor of this book, has a son on death row. She, death-
row inmates, families of victims and offenders, religious and political 
leaders, journalists, criminologists and legal experts present arguments 
against juvenile executions and offer alternative methods of dealing with 
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juvenile violence. Relevant chapters of this book are individually listed 
in this bibliography. 
ll. MENTALLY ILL 
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 
CASE 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
In this death penalty case, the indigent defendant planned to raise the 
insanity defense and requested a psychiatric evaluation at state expense. 
The trial court denied his motion. The Court held that when an indigent 
defendant has made a preliminary showing that sanity at the time of the 
offense may be a significant factor at trial, the state must provide a 
mental health professional's assistance. Chief Justice Burger concurred, 
limiting the holding to the facts of the case. Justice Rehnquist dissented, 
preferring to limit the rule to capital cases and to an independent 
psychiatric evaluation, rather than have the psychiatrist act as an assistant 
to the defense. 
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958). 
This pre-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case affirmed the 
adequacy of the California procedures to determine sanity for execution, 
which were vested in the warden. Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and 
Brennan dissented, questioning Solesbee v. Balcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), 
and finding the California procedures violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
The defendant in this death penalty case was determined competent to 
stand trial after a court ordered psychiatric examination. The defendant 
was found guilty, and at the penalty phase, the doctor who conducted the 
pretrial examination testified as to the defendant's future dangerousness. 
The defendant was then sentenced to death. The Court held the 
admission of the doctor's testimony during the penalty phase violated the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because he was not advised of his rights 
before the pretrial psychiatric examination. 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
A habeas corpus petition was filed on behalf of defendant Alvin Ford 
after a competency hearing failed to stay his execution. After looking to 
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the evol ving standards of decency, the Court held the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of the insane. The Court also found that Florida's 
procedures for determining sanity were inadequate because they 
precluded an opportunity to be heard. The Justices split, however, in 
their suggestions of what type of procedure might be adequate. Justices 
Powell and O'Connor wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice 
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. The dissent found there 
was no Eighth Amendment right for insane persons to be exempt from 
execution. They also found Florida's procedures for determining sanity 
adequate in light of previous precedent and the common law. 
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). 
The defendant, a convicted murderer who had been sentenced to death, 
waived all appeals. His mother filed a petition for a stay of execution on 
his behalf. The Court found nothing in the record to indicate Gilmore 
was incompetent and found that he knowingly and intelligently waived 
his rights to seek an appeal of his death sentence. Thus, the Court held 
his mother had no standing to seek relief on his behalf. Justices White, 
Brennan and Marshall dissented, finding there were serious questions 
about the constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute and about 
Gilmore's competency. Gilmore's life was the subject of Nonnan 
Mailer's Pulitzer prize winning novel, The Executioner's Song. 
Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992). 
The condemned inmate challenged an order to medicate him against his 
will with antipsychotic drugs in order to execute him. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the order and remanded for 
further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 
(1990). The trial court reinstated the order and the inmate appealed. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that an order to forcibly medicate a 
prisoner with antipsychotic drugs violated his right to privacy or 
personhood and constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the state 
constitution. 
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897). 
This pre-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case held that a 
suggestion of post-conviction insanity did not give a condemned prisoner 
the right to have the sanity resolved by a full trial. The Court found 
Georgia's procedures did not violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990). 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a case concerning a 
Louisiana court order to forcibly medicate a condemned inmate in order 
to induce competency so that he could be executed. The Court vacated 
the judgment and remanded the decision for further consideration in light 
of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948). 
This pre-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case addresses the 
issue of the adequacies of procedures in determining restoration of 
competency for execution. The Court held that reasonable discretion 
must be granted to the state tribunal in determining whether a full inquiry 
and hearing on the sanity of a condemned inmate is necessary. Justices 
Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge concurred. 
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). 
This pre-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case dealt with 
procedures necessary for a competency to be executed hearing. The 
Court held that the Georgia statute, giving its governor the power to 
decide questions of sanity for execution purposes, was adequate due 
process. 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
This Supreme Court case deals with a noncapital case, however, it has 
implications for competency for execution. A mentally ill prisoner 
challenged prison policy which involuntarily medicated him with 
antipsychotic drugs, claiming it violated his due process rights. The 
Court held involuntary medication did not violate due process if the 
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in his 
medical interest. The Court also held that due process does not demand 
a judicial hearing before involuntarily medicating an inmate. Justice 
Blackmun concurred. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall concurred 
in part and dissented in part. 
B. ARTICLES, BOOKS, AND WEB SITES 
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL 
HEALTH STANDARDS (1989) . 
. The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Committee 
developed ninety-six standards for dealing with the mentally 
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disadvantaged in the criminal justice system. The standards address 
post-arrest obligations, pretrial evaluations, expert testimony; disclosures 
from pretrial mental evaluations, competence to stand trial, post-
conviction determinations of competency, stays of execution, and 
restoration of competency. The standards also discuss competency and 
confessions and nonresponsibility for crime. The standards look at the 
sentencing of mentally ill and mentally retarded offenders. They discuss 
treatment, admissibility of pretrial assessments, and the right to refuse 
treatment. 
James R. Acker and Charles S. Lanier, Unfit to Live, Unfit to Die: 
Incompetency For Execution Under Modem Death Penalty Legislation, 33 
CRIM. L. BULL. 107 (1997). 
This article addresses the issue of claims of incompetency by condemned 
prisoners. The authors look at existing standards for determining 
competency and rationales for prohibiting the execution of the insane. 
They suggest the prisoner's custodian should have a duty to raise 
incompetency and other parties should also be able to raise this issue. 
They argue the courts should determine whether a hearing is needed to 
decide competency. They assert independent experts should be used to 
evaluate the prisoners and that court appointed experts for prisoners 
should be required. The authors suggest that judges should be the fact 
finders for resolving incompetency claims. They argue the prisoner 
should be given advance notice of a hearing and prisoners should have 
the assistance of counsel while on death row. They also assert cross 
examination should be allowed. They place the burden of proof on the 
prisoner to establish incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and assert that expedited appeals should be allowed. The authors suggest 
incompetent prisoners should have their sentences commuted for life, and 
they discuss the issue surrounding forced medication to establish 
competency for execution. 
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Website Against the Death 
Penalty, at http://www.web.amnesty.orglrmp/dplibrary.nsflindex (last visited 
Oct. 1,2000). 
This site contains extensive substantive information concerning the death 
penalty. Amnesty International reports on the death penalty are available 
in their Web site library going back to 1996. These reports cover many 
death penalty issues, including those concerning the mentally ill, 
mentally retarded, and juveniles. 
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THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS ET AL., BREACH OF TRUST: 
PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN ExEcUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1~94). 
This report by The American College of Physicians, Human Rights 
Watch, The National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, and 
Physicians for Human Rights looks at the nature and extent of physician 
participation in capital punishment. The report begins with a brief 
history of physician involvement in executions. Following this is a 
summary of medical professional organization responses to physician 
participation in executions. The report looks at state statutes and 
regUlations concerning the death penalty and physicians. The 
organizations interviewed witnesses to recent executions and conclude 
current execution procedures require physicians to violate professional 
ethics standards. The report notes institution employed physicians suffer 
when they refuse to participate. The report contains an ethical analysis 
of the participation problem, paying special attention to psychiatric 
evaluation and treatment of the condemned. The report concludes state 
law and regulations directly conflict with ethical standards. It 
recommends changes in the laws to accommodate professional ethics. 
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (James R. Acker et al. 
eds., 1998). 
This book looks at the experiment of capital punishment post-Funnan v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and discusses its failures. The chapters, 
which are written by different authors, examine public opinion, law, 
politics, deterrence, incapacitation and future dangerousness, women, 
children, the mentally retarded, the innocent, incompetent counsel, death-
qualified juries, mitigation, discrimination, habeas corpus, cost of the 
death penalty, physician involvement, families of victims and offenders, 
life on death row, clemency, and executions. Chapters relevant to this 
bibliography have been individually cited. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR 51101187, UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY (1987). 
This book gives an overview of the death penalty in America. It contains 
a chapter on juvenile death sentences, discussing United States domestic 
standards, the Roach case, and International practice. It also contains a 
chapter on the execution of the mentally ill, covering five cases. The 
appendices contain summaries ofimportant United States Supreme Court 
rulings and death penalty statistics. 
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Paul S. Applebaum, Competence to Be Executed: Another Conundrum For 
Mental Health Professionals, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCIDATRY 682 
(1986). 
Dr. Applebaum discusses the dilemmas facing mental health 
professionals who evaluate or treat incompetent condemned inmates. He 
looks at the three different positions professionals might take on the 
issues. He offers two possible resolutions: commuting the sentences of 
the incompetent condemned, and abolishing the requirement that 
prisoners be competent for execution. He concludes by urging the 
profession to try to come to a consensus on an acceptable system. 
Bruce A. Arrigo and Christopher R. Williams, Law. Ideology, and Critical 
Inquiry: The Case of Treatment Refusal For Incompetent Prisoners Awaiting 
Execution, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 367 (1999). 
This article examines the issue of forced medication of condemned 
inmates through the lense of discourse analysis. The authors assert all 
language is method and hidden assumptions and implicit values within 
text can be deciphered through an analysis of the words used. They 
provide a detailed overview of two methods of discourse analysis: 
structural semiotics and deconstructionism. They apply these methods 
and conclude "mental illness," "incompetence," and "execution" are 
words with complex and nuanced meanings that reveal contradictions, 
ambiguities and inconsistencies. They suggest reevaluating the 
assumptions behind law's selection of language before considering 
changes in the law. 
James C. Beck, The Role of Psychiatry in Death Penalty Defense, 21 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCIDATRIC L. 453 (1993). 
This article discusses the roles psychiatrists can play in capital defense 
cases. He argues the psychiatrist's primary function when doing capital 
defense work is to gather data for mitigation purposes. He uses 
individual cases to illustrate the importance of psychiatric defense in the 
early stages of the trial. 
Michael Benjamin, Comment, Constitutional Law: Extent of Procedural Due 
Process Required to Adjudge the Competency of a Condemned Prisoner, 38 
U. FLA. L. REv. 681 (1986). . 
This case comment examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
In the background discussion, the author looks at the due process 
safeguards developed in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); 
Gardnerv. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); andAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
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68 (1985). He ends by suggesting what due process most likely requires 
when a condemned inmate claims insanity. 
Ellen Pels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in 
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 291 (1989). 
This note explores the problem of mental illness being presented as a 
mitigating factor but being considered an aggravating factor. The author 
fIrst looks at statutory schemes involving the death penalty and 
aggravating-mitigating circumstances. She posits that one reason so 
many inmates on death row are mentally ill is that the defendant's 
mitigating evidence of mental illness was considered as an aggravating 
factor. She argues the Supreme Court has indicated that a capital-
sentencing statute cannot term mental illness an aggravating factor, and 
this leads to the conclusion that the factors resulting from mental illness 
cannot be used as aggravating circumstances. She proposes a statutory 
scheme where the defendant would bear the burden of producing 
evidence of mental illness and of a causal relationship between 
aggravating factors and the defendant's mental illness. The state would 
have to show that the circumstances it relies on for a death sentence are 
unrelated to the defendant's mental illness. 
Anthony 1. Bishop, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright· Insanity of the Death Row 
Inmate - A Second Chance?, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 311 (1987). 
This comment examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and 
Johnson v. Cabana, 481 U.S. 1061 (1987) in an effort to determine what 
Ford did concerning condemned inmates claiming insanity. First, the 
author distinguishes Ford from Cabana. Then, he discusses the history 
of the prohibition on executing the insane. He looks at statutory 
provisions concerning the procedures for insanity determinations and at 
Ford's effects on such procedures. He concludes that Ford gives the 
condemned inmate the right to present evidence and witnesses, the right 
to be represented by counsel, and the opportunity to cross-examine 
. witnesses. The author does not believe Ford provided more protection 
than the common law prohibition on executing the insane. 
M. Gregg Bloche, Psychiatry, Capital Punishment, and the Purposes of 
Medicine, 16 J.L. & PSYClDATRY 301 (1993). 
The author discusses the ethical dilemmas confronting psychiatrists in 
capital cases. He fIrst looks at the history of psychiatric involvement in 
capital cases. He places this involvement within the larger phenomenon 
of medical discretion as social gatekeeping. He identifIes the various 
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forms of psychiatric involvement and then discusses the resulting ethical 
harm. He examines the forensic psychiatrists' ethic of truth guideline 
and fmds a tension between truthfulness and the commitment to helping 
people. He asserts medical ethics must protect against the undermining 
of social confidence in the profession. The author examines forensic 
psychiatric practice in capital cases and argues capital punishment risks 
moral integrity and professional credibility to such a degree that 
psychiatrists should not participate. . He proposes tentative ethical 
guidelines. 
James A. Boles, The Ford Case Capital Punishment and the Mentally III in 
Nevada, 52 INTER-ALIA, Nov.lDec. 1987, at Fl. 
The author looks at a Nevada case involving a mentally ill woman and 
concludes imposing the death penalty was disproportionate and 
excessive. He argues the mentally ill defendant found legally sane for 
trial, sentencing, and execution, deserves special protection because the 
death penalty does not serve a retributive or deterrent purpose and the 
punishment is disproportionate and excessive. The author compares this 
case with another Nevada case where a similarly mentally ill defendant's 
sentence was commuted. He finds the two cases too similar to warrant 
such different results. He finds the punishment of death disproportionate 
and excessive because the defendant's level of intent did not rise to the 
level of requiring the death penalty due to her psychiatric problems. 
Richard J. Bonnie, Healing-Killing Conflicts: Medical Ethics and the Death 
Penalty, HASTINGS CrR. REP., May/June 1990, at 12. 
This essay is based on a paper presented to the annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Law Society. The author argues that the ethical 
argument against mental health professionals participating in capital 
cases should be carefully examined. He asserts participation in death 
penalty cases is no different than participation in other criminal cases. 
While he recognizes personal moral scruples may cause the mental health 
professional to abstain, he sees no ethical problem in their participation 
in capital cases. He refutes arguments by other commentators who view 
participation in capital cases as unethical. He finds some problems with 
both the always treat and never treat capital prisoners positions and fmds 
them ethically flawed. He advocates the sometimes treat position. He 
also addresses the question of why insane prisoners are not just executed 
and concludes the justification for this prohibition must be in the dignity 
of the condemned. He looks at the costs of mental health professional 
abstention from capital cases and finds it too high. 
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Richard 1. Bonnie, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in 
Virginia, 66 VA. L. REv. 167 (1980). 
In this Forward to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey of Developments 
in Virginia Law, Professor Bonnie examines the background of capital 
sentencing, Virginia's capital punishment procedures, and the uses of 
psychiatric testimony in capital cases. He also makes recommendations 
in order to reduce the risks of unfairness and inconsistency. 
Daniel Broderick, Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 Y ALELJ. 533 (1979). 
This note asserts that previously approved state procedures for dealing 
with the competency of condemned prisoners are inadequate in light of 
recent Supreme Court decisions expanding procedural due process 
protection. The author proposes a procedural framework for dealing with 
the incompetency claims of condemned prisoners. 
EDMUND O. (PAT) BROWN wrm DICK ADLER, PuBuc JUSTICE, PRIvATE 
MERCY (1989). 
This book by fonner California governor Edmund "Pat" Brown, 
discusses some of the fifty-nine death penalty cases that came before him 
for clemency. Several of the cases involve insanity and mental illness. 
The author discusses the nature of legal insanity and the problems with 
psychiatric judgments. 
Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic 
Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REv. 361 (1994). 
This article examines the issue of forced medication of condemned 
inmates for the purposes of inducing competency to be executed. The 
author notes the difficulty in defining competency and the varying 
standards currently in use. He also looks at the phenomenon of post-
conviction insanity. He examines the rationales behind the prohibition 
on executing the insane. He then looks at the use of antipsychotic drugs 
to treat incompetency. After a discussion of their uses and side-effects, 
he examines Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and its holding 
concerning forcible medication of inmates. He applies this holding to the 
insane condemned. He also looks at the ethical dilemma facing 
psychiatrists involved in competency for execution decisions. He 
discusses Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991), and concludes it is 
difficult to argue forced medication is in the medical interest of an 
incompetent condemned inmate. He urges the Supreme Court to resolve 
this issue. 
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CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL? (Carol D. Foster et a1. eds., 
1992). 
Part of the Information Series on Current Topics, this book gives an 
overview of the capital punishment debate. It includes summaries of 
landmark Supreme Court rulings, including those dealing with juveniles, 
psychiatric testimony, the insane, and the mentally retarded. It also 
reviews death penalty statutes, looking at the minimum age for 
execution, and at the treatment of mental retardation. The book also 
gi ves statistical information on executions, including breakdowns by age 
and education, and an overview of capital punishment around the world. 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Hugo Adam Bedau and 
Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976). 
This work by noted abolitionist Hugo Bedau and Chester Pierce brings 
together post- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), social science 
research on the death penalty in the United States. The book covers 
research concerning the use of social science research in judicial 
decisions, the administration of the death penalty in murder and rape 
cases, public opinion, moral attitudes, deterrence, psychiatry, juries, and 
death row. Chapters relevant to this bibliography are individually cited. 
Christina B. Casals-Ariet and Harvey Bluestone, Competency to Be Executed, 
in CORRECTIONAL PSYCmATRY 121 (Richard Rosner and Ronnie B. Harmon 
eds., 1989). 
This chapter surveys the literature on competency for execution, looks 
at death row stresses, and examines ethical dilemmas for psychiatric 
professionals. The authors note that the effects of death row stresses will 
lead to an increasing number of inmates who become insane on death 
row, and thus raise the specter of competency to be executed issues. 
They look briefly at Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and at the 
ethical questions raised by this case. The views of several commentators 
concerning competency to be executed problems are discussed. The 
authors conclude by raising additional ethical questions and stating their 
own position that psychiatrists should not participate in competency to 
be executed evaluations or treatment. The chapter's appendix 
summarizes some of the literature on this issue. 
David P.S. Charitat, Note, Fraying the Hangman's Knot?: State v. Michael 
Owen Perry, 54 LA. L. REv. 1701 (1994). 
This note examines the Louisiana case of State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 
(La. 1992). In the course of the article, the author provides legal 
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background on exempting the insane from execution and the involuntary 
medication of inmates. After analyzing the Perry opinion, he concludes 
the Louisiana Supreme Court erred by: failing to conduct a complete 
legal analysis, failing to articulate a clear standard of competence for 
execution, mistakenly accepting the artificial sanity rationale rejected in 
the Supreme Court case of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), 
failing to adequately explore the state's police power interest, and over 
expanding privacy rights. He concludes by offering a proposed analysis 
and statute for future Perry cases. 
Jennifer L. Colyer, Comment, Mentally III Murderers: An Orwellian Solution 
From a Southern State, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 541 (1992). 
This article discusses Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991), and the 
issue of involuntarily medicating insane inmates in order to execute 
them The author concludes the Supreme Court is retreating from its 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), decision by denying certiorari 
to inmates making insanity claims. She also concludes the order to 
forcibly medicate Perry does not comply with the two' recognized 
justifications for forced medication of civilly committed patients. She 
reviews federal cases on the forced medication of inmates and argues 
these cases do not support forcible medication for the purposes of 
execution. She also looks at Louisiana statutes dealing with the 
medication of inmates and argues these do not support forcible 
medication for the purposes of execution. She further argues neither 
deterrence nor retribution is served by executing an artificially sane 
defendant. She concludes forcibly medicating an inmate in order to 
execute is unethical and undermines Ford. 
Kevin E. Cox, Note, Execution o/the Insane Criminal: Ford v. Wainwright, 
41 S.W. L.J. 745 (1987). 
After a brief historical overview on the execution of the insane and a 
review of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the author analyzes Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). He concludes Ford merely affrrms the 
current state law but predicts the Supreme Court's due process analysis 
of the Florida statute in the case will cause other states to reassess their 
statutes. 
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Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, Comment, State v. Perry: Louisiana's Cure-to-Kill 
Scheme Forces Death-Row Inmates to Choose Between a Life Sentence of 
Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1193 (1993). 
The author of this comment criticizes the State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 
(La. 1992), decision for not adequately addressing the issues of forced 
medication of incompetent inmates for execution purposes and the 
appropriateness of artificial competence for execution. She begins by 
looking at Supreme Court cases dealing with insanity and antipsycotic 
drugs in prison settings. She then analyzes State v. Perry and criticizes 
it for failing to address whether chemical competency is enough for 
execution and for forcing inmates to choose between suffering insanity 
and possibly facing execution if treated. The author argues chemical 
competency is not sufficient for execution because it is temporary and 
unpredictable. It masks symptoms but does not cure. Thus, she argues, 
chemical competency cannot meet the reliability required for capital 
cases. 
Patrick A. Dawson and J. David Putnal, Note, Ford v. Wainwright: Eighth 
Amendment Prohibits Execution of the Insane, 38 MERCER L. REv. 949 
(1987). 
After setting out a background of the reasons behind the prohibition 
against executing the insane condemned, the authors analyze Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). They also raise a number of future 
issues but do not attempt to address them. 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967). 
This anthology on capital punishment, edited by noted abolitionist Hugo 
Bedau, collects works presenting information about the history and 
implementation of the death penalty, arguments for and against the death 
penalty, social science research on death penalty issues, and case 
histories. This particular edition contains a section on juveniles and the 
death penalty that is omitted in later editions. 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed., 1982). 
This later edition of Hugo Bedau' s anthology on capital punishment 
includes chapters on deterrence, public attitudes towards the death 
penalty, error, constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and 
arguments for and against the death penalty. In the beginning chapters, 
Bedau discusses statutory mitigating circumstances such as diminished 
capacity, mental disturbance, and the age of the offender. 
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Bernard L. Diamond, Murder and the Death Penalty: A Case Report, in 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 445 (Hugo Adam Bedau and 
Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976). 
In this chapter, the author examines the phenomenon wherein murderers 
commit heinous crimes in order to invoke the death penalty in a state 
assisted suicide. He discusses a California death penalty case to 
illustrate this phenomenon. The prisoner had a history of psychiatric 
problems and had attempted to obtain treatment. His treatment attempts 
were unsuccessful so he committed several rape-murders in order to be 
executed. The author asserts this phenomenon raises questions as to the 
deterrent value of the death penalty. 
Richard C. Dieter, International Perspectives On the Death Penalty: A Costly 
Isolation for the U.S., at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglinternational 
report.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2000). 
This report discusses the international trend toward the abolition of the 
death penalty and the United States' position as a violator of human 
rights. Among the issues discussed is the execution of the mentally ill. 
The report discusses several individual cases to illustrate how difficult 
a standard incompetency for execution is. It also discusses the costs of 
the United States' failure to abide by international law regarding capital 
cases. 
George E. Dix, Participation By Mental Health Professionals in Capital 
Murder Sentencing, IINT'L J.L. & PSYClflATRY 283 (1978). 
The author discusses psychiatric testimony in capital sentencing 
procedures in Texas, Ohio, and Arizona. The author finds that a study 
of the Texas experience reveals use of psychiatric testimony in the 
aggravating rather than mitigating factors. In Ohio, he finds an 
uncertainty regarding the significance of psychiatric testimony. In 
Arizona, the author finds a tendency to view certain potentially 
mitigating circumstances as irrelevant due to the labels psychiatrists use. 
George E. Dix, Psychological Abnormality and Capital Sentencing, 7INT'L 
J.L. & PSYCIDATRY 249 (1984). 
This article looks at the concept of diminished responsibility in capital 
sentencing and the role of psychiatric testimony. The author looks at 
state statutes which incorporate diminished responsibility as mitigating 
factors, and the administration of those statutes. After looking at case 
law, he concludes diminished responsibility findings are given little 
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weight in deciding between life and death, and in some cases increase the 
pressure to impose death. 
Robert F. Drinan, The State and Insane Condemned Criminals, 12 JURIST 92 
(1952). 
The author examines Solesbee v. Balcom and concludes the Supreme 
Court erroneously decided that a condemned person's sanity was 
adequately addressed by the Georgia procedure. He agrees with Justice 
Frankfurter's dissent that the issue of a condemned man's sanity must be 
judicially protected. 
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea - Clues to the 
Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell, 1 CRIM. 
L. BULL., Nov. 1965, at 3. 
The author looks at the problem of insanity and capital punishment. He 
asserts the definition of insanity depends on its specific purpose, and the 
problem of legal insanity is unresolved in regards to legal insanity as a 
defense and the execution of the insane. He explores the purposes 
behind punishment and concludes insanity cannot be uniformly defined 
because punishment serves so many conflicting aims. He argues 
exempting the insane from execution cannot be explained under the 
refonn and deterrence rationales. He finds the retributive purpose of 
punishment to be made up of different facets, and each facet results in a 
different attitude toward insane· offenders. He suggests society should 
either be truthful enough to abolish the insanity defense and execute sane 
and insane alike, or abolish the death penalty. 
Van W. Ellis, Note, Guilty But Mentally III and the Death Penalty: 
Punishment Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DUKE LJ. 87 
(1993). 
After examining the proportionality and penological justifications of the 
Eighth Amendment, the author argues the death penalty's application 
must be limited to defendants possessing sufficient cUlpability. He looks 
at the tie between volitional impainnent, culpability, and the death 
penalty in juvenile and mentally retarded cases. He compares this to the 
guilty but mentally ill and concludes that based on a culpability analysis, 
those who are guilty but mentally ill should not be executed. 
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Phoebe C. Ellsworth et at, The Death Qualified Jury and the Defense of 
Insanity, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 81 (1984). 
This article presents the results of a study examining the tendency of 
death-qualified jurors to convict defendants pleading insanity. The 
subjects of the study consisted of thirty-five adults eligible for jury duty 
in California. Subjects were placed in death-qualified and excludable 
categories. Subjects who would have been excluded from juries in 
capital cases were more likely than death-qualified subjects to vote for 
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity~ There was no significant 
difference between subject groups, however, where the insanity defense 
was based on a physical disorder versus a mental disorder. Death-
qualified jurors were more suspicious of the insanity defense. The 
authors argue attitudes toward criminal justice are more important than 
general attitudes toward the mentally ill. They assert insane defendants 
may suffer discrimination in capital cases because death-qualified jurors 
are more skeptical of the insanity defense than those excluded because 
of their opposition to the death penalty. 
Anne S. Emanuel, Guilty But Mentally III Verdicts and the Death Penalty: An 
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 68 N.C. L. REv. 37 (1989). 
The article begins with a history of the guilty but mentally ill verdict. 
The author argues that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill contains a jury 
finding of diminished responsibility. She then performs a proportionality 
analysis pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. She asserts that because of 
the jury's finding of diminished responsibility, the defendant is less 
culpable than other adult offenders. She concludes that this lesser 
culpability means the penological goals of retribution and deterrence are 
not served by executing the guilty but mentally ill. 
Jonathan L. Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, and the Death Penalty: A Note on 
Implementing Supreme Court Decisions, 79 J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218 
(1988). 
The article discusses the difficulty of implementing Ford v. Wainwright, 
. 477 U.S. 399 (1986), The author addresses the lack of a legal defmition 
of insanity, the ethical dilemmas facing psychiatrists involved in cases 
relating to the insane condemned, the types of proceedings that might be 
used in Ford cases, the burden the different types of proceedings might 
impose, and the difficulty in justifying and explaining a rule against 
executing the insane. 
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Paul F. Enzinna and Jana L. Gill, Capital Punishment and the Incompetent: 
Procedures for Determining Competency to Be Executed After Ford v. 
Wainwright, 41 FLA. L. REv. 115 (1989). 
In this article the authors look at due process and Eighth Amendment 
protections for competency procedures for condemned inmates. The 
authors see the prisoner's life and liberty interests as outweighing the 
state's interest in efficiency and flexibility for these proceedings. They 
assert that vague competency standards, failure to provide adequate 
examinations, or refusal to allow inmates to present testimony of their 
own experts may render competency determinations unreliable under the 
Eighth Amendment. They propose a comprehensive system of mental 
health care for the condemned prisoners. Under their system, if a 
prisoner met a heightened standard of incompetency, an adversarial 
hearing would take place. The authors argue the hearing should be held 
by a judge or jury and that condemned prisoners should be represented 
by counsel. They assert states need to set substantive standards 
regulating the psychiatric examinations. 
O. Linn Evans, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: Can a State Treat an Incompetent 
Prisoner to Ready Him For Execution?, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY L. 
249 (1991). 
This article looks at the issue of forcibly medicating insane inmates on 
death row in order to make them competent for execution. The author 
begins with a discussion of Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991), and 
the legal history of the insane and the death penalty. Additionally, the 
author examines Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). The 
author then applies the principles of Harper to Perry. The author argues 
that without evidence Perry was a threat to himse~f or others, Louisiana's 
police power interest does not qualify as a legitimate interest for forcible 
medication. The author asserts that furthennore, there is no parens 
patriae justification for facilitating an incompetent's death. The note 
concludes that forcibly medicating Perry in order to execute him is a 
violation of Harper. The author also argues Perry should have been 
decided under the Eighth Amendment. The note ends by proposing three 
solutions to the ethical dilemma posed for psychiatrists in these cases. 
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Charles Patrick Ewing, "Above All Do No Harm": The Role of Health and 
Mental Health Professionals in the Capital Punishment Process, in 
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 461 (James R. Acker 
et al. eds., 1998). 
This chapter examines the ethical dilemmas health care professionals 
face when they become involved in capital cases. The author focuses on 
three areas: capital sentencing, competency to stand trial, and 
assessment and restoration of competency for execution. He concludes 
participation in competency to stand trial evaluations and treatment is 
ethically permissible, provided the action is narrowly drawn to avoid 
potential harm to the defendant. He finds testimony as to mitigating and 
aggravating factors arguably unethical, and asserts that professionals 
must take precautions to minimize the possibility of a death sentence. He 
concludes participation in assessment and restoration of competency for 
execution is unethical, as is any involvement in the actual execution. 
Charles Patrick Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating "Insanity" On Death Row: 
Legal and Ethical Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. SCI. &L. 175 (1987). 
The author looks at the ethical dilemma in evaluating and treating death 
row inmates. He examines the history and justifications behind the 
prohibition on executing the insane. He finds mental health 
professionals cannot fulfill both the legal and ethical demands in these 
cases. He argues the evaluation and treatment of the insane condemned 
has the practical effect of authorizing the execution, which conflicts with 
the ethical requirements to heal and relieve suffering. He concludes 
psychiatric input is not essential to legal· decisions concerning 
competency to be executed. He suggests that if professionals refuse to 
treat the insane condemned until their sentences are commuted to life, it 
might push legislatures to exempt those inmates found insane from 
execution. He urges a boycott and suggests professional organizations 
prohibit their members from participating in these situations. 
lD. Feltham, The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4 
Melbourne U.L. Rev. 434 (1964). 
This article concerns itself with English common law and the case of The 
Queen v. Tait, (1962) 108 CLR 620. The author argues the common law 
rules giving the courts the power to grant a judicial inquiry into the sanity 
of a condemned prisoner and to reprieve him if he is insane are still 
operative. 
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George C. Grover, Comment, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 246 (1950). 
This comment discusses Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S.4~1 (1948). Theauthor 
debates whether due process or equal protection prohibit an ex parte 
determination of return to sanity by an administrative officer. He 
concludes the newly amended California statute, which provides a 
judicial hearing for the finding of the hospital administrator, is 
appropriate. He suggests additional amendment to the statute in order to 
restore discretion to the warden and to provide a standard for determining 
sanity. 
HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (1996). 
This book discusses the anti-death penalty movement in America from 
1972 to 1994. The author examines the efforts to develop a multi 
organizational network to attack the death penalty. He discusses the 
involvement and contributions of Amnesty International. Amnesty 
International pushed for incremental attacks on the death penalty and 
pursued studies revealing the lack of public support for executions of 
those under eighteen, those with a history of mental illness, and the 
mentally retarded. The book reports the success of legislation 
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded. 
Mark Hansen, Insane Inmate Avoids Death Penalty, 79 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, 
at 32. 
A report on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v. Penry, 610 
So.2d 746 (La. 1992). The Louisiana decision was the first to hold that 
an incompetent condemned inmate could not be involuntarily medicated 
in order to be put to death. 
Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame": Competency and the Execution of 
Condemned Inmates - A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's 
Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. 
LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 105 (1994). 
After reviewing the history and justifications behind the prohibition on 
executing the insane, the author explores the current typical competency 
to execute statute. She criticizes this model, labeling it too simplistic and 
asserting the lack of uniformity violates Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399 (1986), and the Eighth Amendment. She also asserts it does not 
properly address the restoration of competency issue. She proposes an 
alternative competency to execute plan. This plan finds a new term, 
"severe mental impairment" to replace the inadequate terms of 
"incompetence" and "insanity." She defines the term as, at a minimum, 
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including organically caused losses of mental acuity, psychiatric based 
losses, and mental retardation. She proposes requiring an examination 
and assessment of the inmate's functional capability. She also addresses 
the restoration of competency issue, arguing the prevailing position is 
that mental impairment cannot be cured, therefore, a death sentence for 
an inmate meeting her requirement of severe mental impairment should 
be commuted to a life sentence. She concludes by rebutting perceived 
problems with her proposed competency to execute plan. 
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. and David W. Louisell, Death. the State and the 
Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REv. 381 (1962). 
The authors review the scope and purpose of the rule prohibiting the 
execution of the insane and assert the most acceptable justification for 
the rule is that it is unnecessary to execute an insane person. They then 
explore the procedures for evaluating the claim of incompetence both at 
common law and by the states. They discuss the test of insanity and 
argue the appropriate test is whether the defendant's condition is such 
that he or she would be subject to involuntary commitment under 
ordinary circumstances. The authors examine the constitutional 
requirements for a hearing and conclude by proposing a statute on the 
issue. 
Kirk Heilbrun, The Assessment of Competency for Execution: An Overview, 
5 BEHAV. SCI. &L. 383 (1987). 
This article examines some of the problems with evaluating an inmate's 
competency to be executed .. The author looks at the justifications behind 
the competency for execution requirement. He discusses the nature of 
competency for execution and finds little consensus among the states. 
He concludes that a standard for competency to be executed cannot be 
developed until society clarifies what the justification is behind this 
competency. He addresses the process for determining· competency and 
determines a hearing, representation by counsel, and the opportunity to 
present evidence is required. He suggests unbiased examiners with 
clinical-legal and clinical experience make the evaluation. He asserts 
multiple contact with the patient is required, and looks at the problems 
of informed consent and environment. He recommends a written report, 
comprehensive enough to allow others to understand what the examiner 
did and how he/she arrived at that conclusion. He notes the ethical issues 
raised but does not attempt to resolve them. 
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Kirk S. Heilbrun and Harry A. McClaren, Assessment of Competency for 
Execution? A Guidefor Mental Health Professionals, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCffiATRY L. 205 (1988). 
This article discusses the issues of whether mental health professionals 
should assess competency for execution and how such assessment should 
be done. In discussing whether mental health professionals should 
participate, the authors look at the arguments for and against 
participation. They conclude individuals should reflect on their own 
personal beliefs and consult with colleagues who have experienced these 
assessments. As to the procedure, they assert professionals need to 
inform the inmate of the purpose, procedures, and possible consequences 
of an evaluation. They assert the setting must be private and distraction 
free. They recommend looking at independent information on 
functionality and history. They suggest meeting the patient several times 
on different days. They urge full documentation in a written report. 
They conclude by noting areas where further research would be helpful. 
Kirk Heilbrun et aI., The Debate on Treating Individuals Incompetent For 
Execution, 149 AM. 1. PSYCIHATRY 596 (1992). 
The authors address the ethical dilemma posed by treating insane 
condemned inmates. They consider the three positions mental health 
professionals take on treating the condemned incompetent, and find none 
of the positions specific as to defmition of treatment, the nature of the 
disorders, and goals of treatment. They fmd three classes of disorders 
that might render an inmate incompetent for execution. They identify 
possible goals of treatment beyond the recovery of competence. The 
authors discuss the arguments for and against treating the incompetent 
condemned. They conclude a decision to treat should depend on the 
nature of the treatment, goals of the treatment, standards of competency, 
and determination of the inmate's ability to consent to treatment. They 
find that where treatment involves things like psychotropic medicine 
there is a compelling need for fully informed consent. They argue there 
is an ethical demand, even if no legal one, for abstaining from 
involuntary treatment of an incompetent condemned inmate. 
ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE (1989). 
This report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control is based on a study of the death penalty. The report addresses 
the observation of standards and safeguards guaranteeing the rights of 
those facing the death penalty. The report finds twenty-six states had 
minimum death penalty ages from twelve to seventeen or no minimum 
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age at all, thus violating standards for juveniles. The report examines 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989). In addition to juvenile safeguards, the report 
addresses the mentally incapacitated. It finds the federal government and 
some states have modified the insanity defense, and three states have 
abolished it. Twelve states have adopted a guilty but mentally ill verdict, 
which the author believes precludes a death sentence. The report notes 
the problem of death row inmates becoming mentally ill after trial and 
the execution of mentally retarded offenders in the United States. 
Nancy S. Horton, Comment, Restoration of Competency For Execution: 
Furiosus Solo Furore Punitur, 44 Sw. L.J. 1191 (1990). 
This comment addresses the issue of forcible medication of an 
incompetent condemned and concludes restoration of competency 
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The author examines 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in death penalty cases and also 
looks at the history of the restoration of competency. She examines the 
ethical and constitutional problems of restoring competency for 
execution. She recommends states commute the death sentence of 
incompetent prisoners on death row. 
Steven J. Hupp, Note, Ford v. Wainwright, Statutory Changes and a New Test 
For Sanity: You Can't Execute Me, I'm Crazy!, 35 CLav. ST. L. REv. 515 
(1987). 
The author begins by briefly considering the history of insanity and 
execution and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). He asserts 
some states' existing procedures for determining the competency of the 
condemned are no longer valid. He points out three areas that those 
states need to address: the right to a hearing on sanity, the test of 
insanity, and due process in the hearing. He proposes a threshold hearing 
using three disinterested psychiatrists. The proposed test for insanity 
would look at whether the inmate comprehends the physical finality of 
death; understands the causal link between his crime and his execution; 
and knows and understands his property, the nature of his acts, and his 
family and friends. He proposes that counsel for the defense be able to 
present any relevant evidence and be able to cross-examine and impeach 
state psychiatrists. In his suggested procedure, the insanity issue would 
be decided by a judge and not be open to appeal. The author then 
analyzes the Ohio statute and proposes amendments. 
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Stephen L. Dun, Note, Ford v. Wainwright, The Eighth Amendment, Due 
Process and Insanity on Death Row, 7 N.ILL. U. L. REv. 89 (1987). 
This note looks at Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and the 
procedures necessary to satisfy due process for a competency to be 
executed hearing. The author concludes the Court correctly decided it 
was unconstitutional to execute the insane. He discusses the 
requirements of due process and applies these requirements to the 
question of competency to be executed. He argues the mentally 
incompetent prisoner must be appointed counsel near the execution date 
in order for notice to be properly served and to give the inmate an 
opportunity to be heard. He asserts the first hearing should be ajudicial 
inquiry. Subsequent claims should be handled by a panel of psychiatrists 
who interview the prisoner and submit written findings. Judicial review 
should be available but substantial deference would be given to the initial 
determination. 
Rhonda K. Jenkins, Comment, Fit To Die: Drug-Induced Competency For the 
Purpose of Execution, 20 S.ILL. U. L.I. 149 (1995). 
This article examines the issue of forcibly medicating insane inmates in 
order to execute them. The author begins by looking at the justifications 
for prohibiting execution of the insane and then looks at substantive and 
procedural due process problems with this issue. She argues using 
psychoactive drugs does not cure mental illness but only temporarily 
relieves the symptoms and that artificial sanity is not sufficient for 
execution. She asserts forced medication in a death penalty case 
constitutes punishment not treatment and so falls under the Eighth 
Amendment. She examines Perry v. Louisiana, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 
1992), and concludes it was correctly decided. She argues the state must 
commute a condemned inmate's sentence to life imprisonment in order 
to remove the threat of execution and allow them to obtain needed 
treatment. 
Jay E. Kantor, Psychiatry in the Service of the Criminal Punishment System: 
Some Conceptual and Ethical Issues, in 6 CORRECTIONAL PSYCHIATRY 169 
(Richard Rosner and Ronnie B. Harmon eds., 1989). 
This chapter discusses the dual agency ethical dilemma psychiatrists 
working in the criminal justice system face. The author discusses the 
psychiatrist-patient contract, the autonomy and prisoner-patient model, 
and the multiple agency dilemmas involved in the evaluation and 
treatment of prisoners. He examines the competency to be executed 
issue and summarizes the various options psychiatrists in that position 
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have. He asserts the goal of psychiatry to restore autonomy can be 
consistent with inducing competency. He explores the rationales of 
punishment to support this statement. 
David L. Katz, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row -Is 
Judicial Intervention Warranted?, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL Enucs 707 (1991). 
This note examines the issue of forced medication in order to induce 
competency for execution. After a brief discussion of the justifications 
behind the exemption of the insane from execution, the author looks at 
Perry v. Lnuisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991). He examines the ethical codes 
for physicians and looks at how the courts have used these ethical codes. 
He fmds treatment applied solely for execution is a fundamental 
violation of medical ethics, and concludes psychiatrists must never 
prescribe treatment. He argues the Louisiana court in Perry was ordering 
physicians to violate their professional ethics, and he looks at whether 
the Supreme Court should have given judicial support to medical ethics. 
He asserts that the deference given to widely-recognized medical 
principles, the recognition courts have given to these principles, and a 
. national and international consensus against physician participation in 
executions, all indicate the Supreme Court should have expressly 
prohibited forced medication by physicians to induce competency for 
executions. 
William D. Kenner, Competency On Death Row, 8INT'LJ.L. & PSYCIUATRY 
253 (1986). 
In this article the author compares the competency to be executed issue 
with the competency to stand trial issue. He asserts that mental health 
professionals can avoid entanglement with judging how insane an inmate 
needs to be to avoid execution by giving the court a functional diagnosis 
of the condemned inmate. 
Ebrhim J. Kermani and Jay E. Kantor, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: The 
Landmark Supreme Court Cases and Their Ethical Implications For the 
Profession, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCmATRY L. 95 (1994). 
The authors review the recent Supreme Court rulings of Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Perry v. Lnuisiana, 498 U.S. 38 
(1991); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 
504 U.S. 127 (1992); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); and 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); and conclude they exacerbated. 
current and created new ethical dilemmas in psychiatry. They discuss 
ethical and clinical objections to restoring competency. They argue that 
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it is difficult to justify forced restoration of competency in cases of 
prisoners incompetent to be executed because there can be no inference 
that the defendant would consent to therapy so he/she could be executed, 
and such treatment cannot be thought of in the best interests of the 
patient. They assert these arguments can only be overcome if one can be 
convinced the defendant would have consented to treatment if competent 
or if a compelling state interest overrides th~ patient's refusal. The 
authors discuss the ongoing debate concerning mental maturity in 
juveniles and the mentally retarded. They also discuss cases involving 
psychiatric testimony on mitigating and aggravating factors, and victim 
impact testimony. They conclude psychiatrists should be guided by their 
personal beliefs on punishment, moral obligations, civic duty, and patient 
rights when dealing with any of these issues. 
Eric M. Kniskern, Does Ford v. Wainwright's Denial of Executions of the 
Insane Prohibit the State From Carrying Out Its Criminal Justice System?, 26 
S.U. L. REv. 171 (1999). 
This article examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and 
Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991). The author looks at the issues 
that have arisen from these two cases, particularly the issue of forcibly 
medicating incompetent inmates in order to execute them. He proposes 
three separate solutions to the problem of an inmate who has regained 
sanity: commute the sentence to life without parole, have mandatory 
counseling, or abolish the death penalty. 
Dorean M. Koenig, Freedom or Death: Two Doors in the Criminal Justice 
System (A Comparison of the Insanity Defense and Capital Sentencing), 2 
COOLEY L. REv. 341 (1984). 
The author looks at the' intersection between law and mental health 
science and concludes the question of insanity has suffered as a result. 
The author explores the evolution of the insanity defense. The author 
argues the criminal justice system is based on theories of free will, while 
the mental health professions are based on the theory of determinism. 
The author asserts the result of trying to interface the two has expanded 
the definition of insanity and led to a backlash against the defense due to 
the release of dangerous criminals. The author fmds the test of insanity 
became the test for future dangerousness, thus the same test can lead to 
freedom or to death. 
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Paul J. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the 
Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1980). 
The author argues the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of the 
presently incompetent. He surveys the Supreme Court's treatment of 
Gilmore-type cases and describes the Court's approach to capital 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. He concludes that in light of 
Anglo-American common law history, contemporary statutes, and the 
Court's own doctrines, execution of the incompetent would be cruel and 
unusual punishment. He proposes a standard for present incompetency 
and procedures for raising and resolving the issue. 
Barry Latzer, Death Penalty Cases: Leading U.S. Supreme Court Cases on 
Capital Punishment (1998) . 
. This book contains excerpts of the Supreme Court cases on the death 
penalty. It also contains a brief overview of the history of the Eighth 
Amendment, capital laws and procedures, and the capital punishment 
debate. The appendix contains facts and figures on murder and the death 
penalty. Cases discussed that are relevant to this bibliography include 
Stanjordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399 (1986); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). 
James S. Liebman and Michael 1. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing 
Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating 
Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978). 
This article examines five Supreme Court decisions handed down on July 
2, 1976: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,428 
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 
(1976). The authors distill from these cases a doctrinal framework of the 
Eighth Amendment. They assert a statute attempting to enumerate 
exclusive mitigatory factors is unconstitutional and that a defendant has 
a right to jury instructions on guided individualization. The authors 
apply their doctrinal framework to the treatment of mental illness as a 
mitigation and conclude a mentally disordered offender should receive 
mitigatory consideration. In order to determine the degree of mitigation, 
they propose a four-factor analysis. They apply this analysis to the 
mentally retarded and the sociopath and conclude there is a compelling 
case for reducing a death sentence for a mentally retarded offender. 
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Dana Lowy, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: To Execute or Not to Execute a 
Mentally Incompetent Convicted Criminal ... That Remains the Question, 21 
Sw. U. L. REv. 205 (1992). 
This note examines Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991), and argues 
that on remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court must vacate the death 
sentence in order to properly apply the principles expressed in Ford v. 
Wainwright. 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210 (1990). The author asserts Michael Perry has never been a threat to 
himself or others, thus involuntarily medicating him in order to execute 
him does not pass the Harper test. She argues Perry's interests outweigh 
the state's interest in seeing its criminal penalties enforced. She also 
argues involuntarily medicating him to force competency for execution 
would undermine the Ford v. Wainwright prohibition against executing 
the insane. Furthermore, she finds it would violate medical ethics. 
D' Andrea McMooian, Casenote, Perry v. Louisiana - Has the Judicial Branch 
Overstepped Its Boundaries Into the Sacred Area of Constitutional Rights?, 
19 S.u. L. REv. 231 (1992). 
This note discusses Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991), and 
concludes the Louisiana Supreme Court violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments when it issued an order forcibly medicating an 
insane condemned inmate so that he could be executed. The author 
argues that involuntarily injecting Perry with psychotropic medication 
that has potentially serious side effects violates the dignity of man 
principle underlying the Eighth Amendment. The author asserts this 
involuntary medication is not treatment, but rather punishment, and could 
allow Louisiana to execute an insane man. The author argues 
Louisiana's law concerning forced medication creates a liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process clause. 
Robert D. Miller, Evaluations of and Treatment to Competency to be 
Executed: A National Survey and an Analysis, 16 1. Psychiatry & L. 67 
(1988). 
This article addresses the procedures for the determination of 
competency and treatment of incompetent death row inmates. The author 
conducted a national survey of attorney generals of states with capital 
punishment. He concludes very few states have procedures to determine 
competency that would pass the Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 
(1986), test. He found few states were aware of specific procedures 
addressing the rights of incompetent inmates to refuse treatment. None 
of the participants in the survey were sure whether state mental health 
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professionals would be required to forcibly medicate incompetent 
inmates. The author finds the preferred policy· of mental health 
professionals is commutation of death sentences, but since few states 
provide for this, the author proposes the states permit treatment solely to 
render the patient competent to make treatment decisions. Then the 
competent inmate can decide whether or not to continue treatment. 
Gordon L. Moore m, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: A Code in the 
Executioner's Song, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1461 (1987). 
The author analyzes Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and 
proposes possible standards that the states should follow when dealing 
with the issue of competency for execution. He finds Ford to be 
imprecise and troubling for states because the Court gave little guidance 
on what procedures for a competency hearing comply with due process 
requirements. He proposes a solution where the fact fmder is given a 
single opinion based on a long-term. comprehensive examination by a 
team of impartial psychiatrists. He suggests this examination should be 
granted on an initial showing by the inmate governed by a sufficient 
doubt standard. The results of the examination would be presented in a 
court administered hearing. 
Douglas Mossman, Assessing and Restoring Competency to Be Executed: 
Should Psychiatrists Participate?, 5 BEHAV. SCI. &L. 397 (1987). 
The author argues the evaluation and treatment of the insane condemned 
does not violate ethical standards. He examines objections to psychiatric 
participation in evaluating competency for execution and asserts they 
over-extend the psychiatrist's role in the competency assessment. He 
points out that psychiatrists can avoid the stigma of having imposed a 
death sentence by their evaluation by insisting on procedural safeguards 
and pronouncing findings that leave the ultimate determination to 
execute to legal authorities. He argues the state's interest in carrying out 
sentences and the loss of liberty that inmates experience may relieve the 
usual requirements of informed consent. He also asserts that a finding 
of incompetency to give consent may allow for an assessment of 
competency to be executed. He examines traditional objections to 
psychiatric treatment of the incompetent condemned and argues the oath 
to preserve life has exceptions and that treatment of the condemned has 
other purposes than just execution. He argues patient autonomy and the 
right to refuse treatment may be less important where the state's interests 
must also be considered. He asserts psychiatrists have a duty to !etum 
patients to a condition where they can be punished and that these patients 
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have implicitly consented to treatment by their choice to commit the 
original crime. 
Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording 
Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1 (1992). 
This lengthy article looks at the ethical dilemmas facing psychiatrists 
who evaluate and treat the incompetent condemned. The author 
examines four types of arguments used by critics of psychiatric 
involvement with the incompetent, condemned and asserts those 
arguments are internally inconsistent. He argues that if one assumes 
capital punishment is just and administrated fairly, psychiatrists no 
longer face an ethical dilemma and may evaluate and treat the insane 
condemned. He concludes this leaves psychiatry with two alternatives: 
officially opposing the death penalty on moral grounds, or supporting 
efforts to develop procedures for evaluating and treating the incompetent 
condemned. 
Sanford M. Pastroff, Note, Eighth Amendment - The Constitutional Rights of 
the Insane on Death Row, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 844 (1986). 
The author examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and 
concludes that although the decision is a logical extension of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court erred in not providing minimal due 
process guidelines and in not specifying the rationale for exempting the 
insane from execution. He suggests that for raising a claim to insanity, 
the state should allow a prisoner at least one hearing as a matter of right. 
A full trial and a jury are not necessary, however, the prisoner must be 
given an opportunity to be heard. He asserts an impartial authority 
should hear the evidence. He suggests a high threshold requirement for 
a hearing is necessary to avoid repeated claims of insanity. He argues 
procedures determining restoration of competency must be more 
stringent than those determining competency. He asserts the test for 
insanity must be tailored to the purposes of the rule banning execution 
of the insane. He finds the rule can only be justified by the belief that the 
execution of an insane person has less retributive value than that of a 
normal person. 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991). 
This book on the death penalty is divided into five parts. Part I gives an 
overview of capital punishment. Part II discusses the legal challenges to 
the death penalty pre-Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and 
discusses legal challenges and reform of the death penalty after Gregg v. 
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Georgia. This part addresses mitigation evidence such as youth or 
mental illness. This part also examines the execution of special groups 
such as the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. The Supreme 
Court cases of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988); and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), are discussed. 
Part ill deals with racial discrimination and arbitrariness. Part IV 
discusses arguments for and against the death penalty. Part V looks at 
alternatives to capital punishment. 
Michael Radelet and George W. Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric 
Detennination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCIllATRY L. 37 (1986). 
The authors assert the rules prohibiting the execution of the mentally ill 
are too vague, and this vagueness exacerbates the ethical dilemma of 
physicians participating in the process. They urge change is needed and 
conclude that until definitions and procedures are changed, a psychiatric 
evaluation finding a person competent to be executed must be clearer, 
more certain, and more comprehensive than a finding of incompetence. 
Michael Radelet and George W. Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent 
For Execution: Ethical Chaos With Only One Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCIllATRY L. 297 (1988). 
This article addresses the ethical principles and dilemmas raised in 
treating the insane condemned. The authors look at the dilemmas in the 
context of the Gary Alvord case and report staff reactions to his 
treatment. They conclude the ethical dilemma can only be resolved by 
commuting the death sentences of the incompetent condemned to long-
term imprisonment. 
Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court and 
Capital Punishment: Should the U.S.A. Put the Death Penalty to Death?, 50 
N. IR. LEGAL Q. 50 (1999). 
This article gives an overview of important death penalty cases. In 
particularit discusses Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), concerning juveniles; Ford 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), concerning the insane; and Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); concerning the mentally retarded. 
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Michael B. Ross, Don't Execute Mentally Disturbed Killers, 59 THE 
HUMANIST, Jan. 1999, at 43. 
This article by an author on death row urges new verdict forms to protect 
the mentally ill from execution. He argues that although mental 
disorders are to be considered mitigating factors, too many mentally ill 
offenders are on death row. He asserts defendants face two problems 
trying to prove diminished capacity: the skepticism of jurors and the 
heinous nature of capital crimes. He argues the death penalty should be 
limited to vicious, premeditated crimes; and that mentally ill defendants 
do not perform such acts. He urges the introduction of "guilty but 
mentally ill" and "guilty but mentally retarded" verdict forms and 
prohibiting the death penalty for such verdicts. He advocates a sentence 
of life without parole in those circumstances. 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PuNISHMENT, ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 1949-1953 REpORT (1953). 
This report looks at capital punishment in Great Britain and whether it 
should be changed or limited. In the course of answering this question, 
the report looks at insanity and mental abnormality. The Commission 
examines the law and practice in foreign countries, including the United 
States. Great Britain later abolished the death penalty. 
Rochelle Graff Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to be 
Executed, 96 YALELJ. 167 (1986). 
The author focuses on the ethical dilemma that exists when physicians 
are called upon to treat the incompetent condemned. She analyzes the 
state interests involved in using medical professionals to implement 
competency to be executed statutes and proposes possible resolutions to 
the ethical dilemma created by the state. 
Douglas A. Sargent, Treating the Condemned to Death, HASTINGS CENTER 
REp., Dec. 1985, at 5. 
This article addresses the dilemma facing psychiatrists when they deal 
with condemned inmates. He argues psychiatrists betray the patient's 
trust when they treat inmates so they can be executed. He asserts to do 
so violates professional ethics. He finds the American Psychiatric 
Association Council on Psychiatry's proposal to insulate therapists to be 
"least-restrictive self-deception." He argues it is unethical to diagnose 
competency to be executed and compares such state directed ethical 
violations to Josef Mengele, the Nazi Angel of Death. 
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WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DBA TIl PENALTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993). 
This study analyzes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, international 
humanitarian law, the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
Geneva Convention, and other international law instruments. The author 
discusses the emergence of customary norms prohibiting the death 
penalty. He traces the development of the exclusion of certain categories 
of persons from the death penalty. In particular, he looks at the exclusion 
of juveniles and the insane. He predicts the prohibition of the death 
penalty per se will be a customary international norm andjus cogens in 
the future. 
William A. Schabas,lntemational Nonns on Execution o/the Insane and the 
Mentally Retarded, 4 CRIM. L.F. 95 (1993). 
This article addresses the question of whether there is an international 
norm prohibiting the execution of the insane and mentally retarded. The 
author traces the history of this norm, from its beginnings in English 
common law to the United Nation's list of safeguards concerning 
implementation of the death penalty. He fmds there is no evidence that 
any state actually executes the insane, and thus concludes state practice 
supports an international norm prohibiting execution of the insane. He 
regards the U.N. safeguards as indicating the opinio juris of its member 
states. He cautions that procedural guarantees in capital cases dealing 
with the insane must be rigorously applied. He concludes he cannot 
affirmatively assert an international norm prohibiting execution of the 
mentally ill as distinguished from the insane. 
C. Robert Showalter, Psychiatric Participation in Capital Sentencing 
Procedures: Ethical Considerations,13INT'LJ.L. &PSYCIllATRY 261 (1990). 
This article discusses the role of psychiatrists in capital cases. The 
author argues legal and judicial opinions cannot be used as ethical 
guidelines for forensic psychiatrists. He examines the ethical problem 
of informed consent and asserts that where jurisdictions do not insulate 
clinical evaluation evidence from use against the defendant, the 
psychiatrist should give adequate warning before any evaluation. He 
also looks at the problem of improper interpretations of psychiatric 
testimony and cites a Virginia law as a possible solution to this problem: 
creating an explicit prohibition on using the defendant's statements in a 
psychiatric evaluation as evidence of aggravation. He sees the need for 
ethical guidelines and standards for forensic psychiatrists and asserts 
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these guidelines should come from recognized theories and standards in 
psychiatry. 
C. Robert Showalter and Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital 
Sentencing: Risks and Responsibilities in a Unique Legal Setting, 12 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCIDATRY L. 159 (1984) .. 
This article discusses psychiatric evaluation and testimony in capital 
sentencing situations. The authors look at mitigating mental abnormality 
and future dangerousness. They warn psychiatrists must be sensitive to 
the limits of their experience and appropriately qualify their opinions. 
Robinette R. Shultz, Note, Loophole to Execution - Ford v. Wainwright, 20 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 867 (1987). 
After discussing the history of death penalty jurisprudence, the author 
examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and concludes the 
Court erred in deciding the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution 
of the insane. She argues the purposes of deterrence and retribution are 
not served by banning execution of the insane. She asserts offenders will 
claim insanity in order to escape execution. She looks at the facts of 
Ford and asserts Ford never claimed to be insane until ten days before 
his execution and that Ford had amPle time to understand the nature and 
purpose of his punishment. She argues offenders should not be allowed 
an unlimited right to postpone executions. She concludes the Court 
should have focused on the character of the offender and whether the 
offender understood the nature of his punishment. 
Mark A. Small and Randy K. Otto, Evaluations of Competency to Be 
Executed, 18 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAv. 146 (1991). 
This article looks at the legal, clinical, and ethical aspects of a 
competency to be executed evaluation. The authors summarize the 
substantive and procedural requirements for competency evaluations 
pursuant to Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). They find no clear 
ethical guidelines for mental health professionals evaluating the 
competency of condemned inmates and assert the professional must 
make hislher own decision. They provide basic guidelines regarding 
disclosure and evaluation techniques. They caution mental health 
professionals to avoid giving legal opinions as to the inmate's 
competency to be executed. 
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Mark A. Small, Comment, Performing "Competency to Be Executed" 
Evaluations: A Psycholegal Analysis for Preventing the Execution of the 
Insane, 67 NEB. L. REv. 718 (1989). 
The author of this comment examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 
(1986), and looks at evaluation and treatment issues raised by the 
decision. He argues that when states revise their statutes to comply with 
Ford, they should take into account the administration of psychological 
assessments of competency. Specifically, he asserts the need to examine 
sources of bias, limits of confidentiality, competency to consent, Fifth 
Amendment rights, and the reported findings. He also briefly looks at 
treatment issues. He analyzes the Nebraska statute and finds it is 
unconstitutional in light of Ford. To revise the Nebraska statute, he 
suggests adopting language from mental health commitment statutes and 
insanity defense statutes. 
Charles E. Smith and Richard Reid Felix, Beyond Deterrence: A Study of 
Defenses on Death Row, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1986, at 55. 
This study looks at the individual characteristics of thirty-four death row 
inmates. The study looks at demographic information, offense 
information, mental status, interpersonal relationships, and inmate 
defenses. 
George F. Soloman, Capital Punishment as Suicide and as Murder, in 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 432 (Hugo Adam Bedau and 
Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976). 
The author discusses the phenomenon of capital punishment and death-
seeking behavior. He first discusses learned violence and the process 
wherein society adopts murder as a problem-solving mechanism, thereby 
encouraging some murderers to do likewise. He relates the case histories 
of two murderers who killed in a conscious attempt to invoke the death 
penalty and commit state-assisted suicide. He argues both society and 
individuals must learn better problem-solving methods. 
Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The 
Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 
41 HASTINGS L.J. 409 (1990). 
The author examines the phenomenon of sentencers improperly 
considering mitigating factors, such as mental illness, as aggravating 
factors. He looks at death penalty cases and distills two principles that 
are required in death penalty schemes: individualization and guidance. 
He argues Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982), provides means to 
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challenge death penalty schemes that allow mislabeling of mitigating 
factors. He finds modem death penalty statutes unconstitutional because 
they fail to guide the jury in understanding and applying mitigating 
factors; permit and encourage improper aggravating circumstances to be 
considered; permit the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors; and 
violate Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), by allowing mitigating 
factors to be weighed as aggravating factors rather than independent 
mitigating weight. He proposes solutions to this problem, suggesting 
mandatory jury instructions that: (1) inform the jury of the penological 
justifications for capital punishment; (2) define aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances; and (3) address each mitigating factor offered 
by the defendant. 
o. Richard Strafer, Volunteering For Execution: Competency, Voluntariness 
and the Propriety o/Third Party Intervention, 741. Crim. L. & Criminology 
860 (1983). 
The author criticizes the courts for their cursory response to condemned 
inmates who waive appeals to execution. He explores several cases and 
argues that individuals who volunteer for execution suffer from suicidal 
impulses and suffer from the brutal and dehumanizing conditions on 
death row. He asserts there must be a comprehensive inquiry into the 
voluntariness of the waiver, and the inquiry must take into account the 
nature of the death decision and the coercive conditions of death row. 
He addresses arguments about the inmate's "right to die" and discusses 
the rights of third parties to intervene in such situations. 
Shannon S. Sullivan, Case Note, Ford v. Wainwright: States Cannot Execute 
the Insane - But How Is Insanity Determined?, 20 1. MARSHALL L. REv. 549 
(1987). 
The author examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and 
concludes the Court correctly decided that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited the execution of the insane and that the Florida procedures to 
determine competency were inadequate. The author criticizes the Court 
for not providing minimum due process standards for competency 
determinations. She asserts the Court should have defmed the threshold 
showing of insanity and foresees disparate treatment of insane prisoners 
as a result. She argues the Court should have held that a neutral party 
must appoint a panel of psychiatrists to examine the defendant, and 
concludes states will interpret this silence as allowing biased examiners. 
Finally, she argues the Court should have held that the prisoner has a 
right to raise the initial insanity claim. 
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The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, Leading Case, 100 MARv. L. REv. 100 
(1986). 
As part of this review of Supreme Court decisions, the ruling of Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), is discussed. The article finds the 
Supreme Court's divisiveness and vagueness concerning adequate 
procedures for determining the sanity of a condemned prisoner will lead 
to more litigation and greater disparity in state policies. 
WILLIAMTALLACK,HUMANITY AND HUMANITARIANISM (1871). 
This book looks at the prison systems of Great Britain and the United 
States. While much of the information and ideas are dated, the section 
on insanity and capital punishment discusses issues that are still 
problematic today. For example, the author examines the process for 
detennining insanity and what kinds of experts should be involved. He 
also states it is unjust to execute the insane and looks at the connection 
between executions and increased murders. 
Task Force on the Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, American 
Psychiatric Association, Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, in IsSUES IN 
FORENSIC PSYCInATRY 181 (1984). 
This report looks at psychiatric participation in the sentencing process. 
The report notes the increasing role of psychiatrists in this process due 
to the individualization requirement of capital sentences. The task force 
states psychiatrists can partiCipate in capital trials and should make a 
good faith effort to conduct thorough examinations while adhering to an 
individual-centered orientation. The task force asserts psychiatrists 
should rely on the doctrine of informed consent and suggests guidelines 
concerning what form the examination should take, the scope of the 
examination, what should be done with iIimates incompetent to give 
consent, the form a report on an evaluation should take, statements on 
limitations of expertise, testimony on ultimate issues, and legal issues 
that might come up. 
Jonathan Taylor, Note, 9 U. ARK. LITIl..E ROCK L. REv. 385 (1986-1987). 
This note discusses the historic ban on executing the insane and looks at 
death penalty jurisprudence. The author examines Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399 (1986), and finds the decision significant because it creates 
a new constitutional right. He notes Ford v. Wainwright is part of a 
movement by the Court to restrict the death penalty. 
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Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially Competent": 
Cruel and Unusual?, 66 TvLANEL. REv. 1045 (1992). 
The author addresses the issue of forced medication of condemned 
insane inmates in order to execute them. After looking at Eighth 
Aritendment jurisprudence, the author states Ford v. Wainwright's failure 
to define competency makes it unclear if drug-induced competency is 
sufficient or if any conditions of reliability or predictability of 
competency are required. He looks at Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 . 
(1991) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and concludes 
that under the Due Process Clause, the state arguably must be allowed to 
forcibly medicate against an incompetent prisoner's will because it 
cannot otherwise carry out the sentence of death. He also concludes that 
forcibly medicating death row inmates to induce competency is an 
attempt to. circumvent the Eighth Amendment· prohibition against 
executing the insane. 
University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center, Focus On the Death Penalty, 
at http://www.uaa.alaska.eduljustldeathlissues.html (last visited Oct. 1,2(00). 
This Web site attempts to provide links to resources from both sides of 
the death penalty debate. This particular area of the site addresses 
specific issues. In addition to infonnation on deterrence, retribution and 
justice for murder victims, the innocent, limiting appeals and habeas 
corpus reform, costs of the death penalty, alternative sentencing, fairness, 
moratorium, cruel and unusual punishment, and women, the site provides 
links to statistical information and cases concerning juveniles, the 
mentally retarded, and the mentally ill. 
Donald H. Wallace, Incompetency for Execution: The Supreme Court 
Challenges the Ethical Standards of the Mental Health Professions, 8 J. 
LEGAL MEn. 265 (1987). 
The author identifies and discusses ethical issues raised by Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). He finds a conflict with the healing 
ethic when an opinion of competency may enable the state to take a life. 
He analogizes the treatment of a condemned incompetent inmate to lethal 
injection. He comPares a condemned inmate's right to refuse treatment 
to civil commitment and competency to stand trial. He looks at 
arguments supporting professional involvement in evaluating and treating 
incompetence for execution purposes and concludes they inject 
hypocrisy into th~ debate because participation by evaluation and 
treatment creates the impression of moral sanction for capital 
punishment. He suggests that professional organizations should 
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explicitly label involvement in evaluation and treatment of the 
incompetent condemned as unethical and subject to disciplinary action. 
He proposes several solutions to the ethical dilemma, including refusal 
of treatment and the appointment of adversary mental health 
professionals. 
Donald H. Wallace, The Need to Commute the Death Sentence: Competency 
for Execution and Ethical Dilemmas for Mental Health Professionals, 15 
INT'L J.L. & PSYClllA TRY 317 (1992). 
The author looks at post-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), 
decisions of courts and explores the guidance these decisions give mental 
health professionals involved in assessing and treating insane condemned 
inmates. The article looks at the gaps and ambiguities left by Ford and 
at attempts by lower courts to clarify and fill those gaps. The author then 
looks to ethical issues invol ving the treatment of incompetent condemned 
inmates. He finds the actions of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. 
Cabana, 481 U.S.1061 (1987), and Lowenfield v. Butler, 485 U.S. 995 
(1988), undermine Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). He 
proposes two solutions to the ethical dilemmas posed by the insane 
condemned. One solution is to amend ethical standards. The other is to 
commute the sentence of the incompetent insane to life. 
Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and 
Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35 (1986). 
The author discusses psychiatric participation in determining competency 
and treating incompetent condemned patients. She examines the ethical 
dilemma facing psychiatrists who have a duty to treat the mentally ill but 
whose treatment may lead to an execution. 
Louis Jolyon West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (Hugo Adam Bedau and Chester M. 
Pierce eds., 1976). 
The author asserts the death penalty should be abolished because capital 
punishment is outdated, immoral, wasteful, cruel, brutal, unfair, 
irrevocable, obstructive, and dangerous. She discusses the ethical 
dilemmas with which the death penalty confronts psychiatrists. She finds 
physicians, sworn to preserve life, are placed in a position where inmates 
are executed based on their testimony. She discusses the problem of 
death row conditions causing psychiatric deterioration and the resulting 
problem of the mentally ill condemned inmate. She argues capital 
punishment breeds violence, particularly in those with suicidal urges. 
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She illustrates her argument with cases of death row inmates who 
murdered so that the state would put them to death. She urges the 
medical profession to declare any physician participation in an execution 
unethical. 
Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial, 11 
L. & HUM. BEHA v. 113 (1987). 
The author reports the results of an exploratory study conducted to 
examine the death penalty decision process and to assess the 
effecti veness of several defense strategies. The defense strategies tested 
were: anti-capital punishment defense, social history defense, mental 
illness defense, and no defense. The study finds jurors exposed to the 
anti-capital punishment defense were the least punitive while jurors 
exposed to the mental illness defense were the most punitive. The other 
defense results were not significantly different from each other. The 
author hypothesizes the mental illness defense was ineffective due to 
juror feelings that mental illness is no excuse, that the defendant is 
faking, and that the defendant should have gotten help for his problems. 
The author finds these results consistent with other studies. 
Lawrence T. White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty 
Hearing, 5 BEHAV. SCI. &L. 411 (1987). 
This article looks at the effectiveness of the mental illness defense in 
capital trials. The author looks at three studies and finds that in all of 
them the mentally ill defense was ineffective. One study even found the 
mentally ill defense was less effective than no defense at all. The author 
looks at studies of insanity defense acquittals in an attempt to determine 
what factors are associated with a successful mentally ill defense. He 
finds the defense is more iikely to be successful if psychiatrists 
recommend it, if the defendant is diagnosed with a psychosis, if the 
defendant has a history of psychiatric treatment or hospitalization, and 
if there is objective evidence of psychopathology. He also finds the 
defense more likely to succeed if the defendant is female or if the jury 
contains mostly women. He finds jurors more likely to impose a death . 
sentence if they feel the defendant is going to be dangerous in the future. 
The author points out that death-qualified jurors tend to be crime control 
oriented and suspicious of psychological excuses for criminal acts. 
WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES (1987). 
In this book, the author explores plea bargaining, the penalty trial, 
discrimination, defendants who choose execution, and death-qualified 
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juries. In his discussion of the penalty trial, the author looks at the role 
of mental health professionals and mitigating evidence. In his discussion 
on defendants who choose to waive appeals and be executed, he looks at 
the issues of patient autonomy and competency. He argues that the issue 
of competency should focus on whether the defendant has the ability to 
knowingly and voluntarily choose between life and death. He explores 
the reasons defendants might choose execution and notes the conditions 
on death row and the urge for self-destruction. He links this 
phenomenon to the role of deterrence and suggests that the death penalty 
may be a less effective deterrent than life imprisonment. 
WELSH S. WHITE, LIFE IN TIlE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN 
CAPITAL CASES (1984). 
This book looks at procedural issues involved in death penalty cases. 
The author looks at voir dire and death-qualified jurors. He discusses 
disproportionality and the death penalty. He examines police trickery in 
inducing confessions and Fifth Amendment concerns with psychiatric 
evaluations. In his discussion of Fifth Amendment concerns and 
psychiatric evaluations, he examines Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 
(1981). There the Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the 
defendant was entitled to Miranda warnings before a psychiatric 
evaluation and that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was also violated. The author discusses the implication of this holding 
to mentally ill defendants in capital cases. He analyzes the waiver by 
offer of psychiatric evidence doctrine and asserts safeguards are needed 
to limit the doctrine's effects. He suggests prohibiting the examiner from 
testifying for the government, bifurcating the issues of insanity and guilt, 
providing an attorney during examination, and restricting the scope of the 
examination or postponing the examination until after the guilt phase is 
over. 
Welsh S. White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment 
Privilege in Capital Cases, 741. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943 (1983). 
The article analyzes the "waiver by offer of psychiatric testimony" 
doctrine and examines its application. The author closes by suggesting 
safeguards to minimize the possibility the prosecution will use evidence 
derived from a psychiatric examination in an unauthorized manner. 
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Welsh S. White, Waiver and the Death Penalty: The Implications o/Estelle 
v. Smith, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1522 (1981). 
This article addresses waiver and Sixth Amendment issues involved in 
psychiatric examinations in light of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 
(1981). The author argues that the Supreme Court in Estelle equated the 
psychiatric examination of the defendant with a custodial police 
interrogation. He speculates familiar Miranda warnings before a 
psychiatric examination may not be enough in a capital case, and that the 
state may need to specifically warn the defendant that a jury could use 
statements made in the psychiatric examination to sentence a defendant 
to death. He also asserts Estelle redefined the right to an attorney when 
it recognized a defendant's right to an attorney in deciding whether to 
submit to a psychiatric exam. 
m. MENTALLY RETARDED 
A. SUPREME COURT CASE 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 491 U.S. 302 (1989). 
The defendant, Johnny Paul Penry, was mildly retarded, with the mental 
age of a six-and-a-half-year-old. He filed for habeas corpus relief. After 
dealing with a retroactivity issue, the Court addressed whether the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the jury could not 
adequately consider all of the mitigating evidence, and whether it was 
cruel and unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded offender. 
The majority, made up of Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, found the jury was not able to adequately 
consider all of the mitigating evidence presented due to the nature of the 
Texas death penalty statute and the lack of ~uring instructions to the jury. 
The majority, made up of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Rehnquist, White, 
and Kennedy, applied the evolving standards of decency test and found 
there was no national consensus that executing the mentally retarded 
offended the evolving standards of decency. Justice O'Connor further 
held executing the mentally retarded does not violate the proportionality 
requirement. 
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B. BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND WEB SITES 
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL 
HEALTH STANDARDS (1989). 
The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Committee 
developed ninety-six standards for dealing with the mentally 
disadvantaged in the criminal justice system. The standards address 
post-arrest obligations, pretrial evaluations, expert testimony, disclosures 
from pretrial mental evaluations, competence to stand trial, post-
conviction determinations of competency, stays of execution, and 
restoration of competency. The standards also discuss competency and 
confessions and nonresponsibility for crime. The standards look at the 
sentencing of mentally ill and mentally retarded offenders. They discuss 
treatment, admissibility of pretrial assessments, and the right to refuse 
treatment. 
AMERICA'S ExPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (James R. Acker et at. 
eds., 1998). 
This book looks at the experiment of capital punishment post-Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and discusses its failures. The chapters, 
which are written by different authors, examine public opinion, law, 
politics, deterrence, incapacitation and future dangerousness, women, 
children, the mentally retarded, the innocent, incompetent counsel, death-
qualified juries, mitigation, discrimination, habeas corpus, cost of the 
death penalty, physician involvement, families of victims and offenders, 
life on death row, clemency, and executions. Chapters relevant to this 
bibliography b'ave been individually cited. 
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Website Against the Death 
Penalty, at http://www. web. amnesty .orglrmp/dplibrary.nsflindex (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2000). 
This site contains extensive substantive information concerning the death 
penalty. Amnesty International reports on the death penalty are available 
in their Web site library going back to 1996. These reports cover many 
death penalty issues, including those concerning the mentally ill, 
mentally retarded, and juveniles. 
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AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR 511195199, UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA BEYOND REASON: THE EXECUTION OF JOHN PAUL PENRY, Dec. 
1999, at 1. 
This report discusses Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and the 
results of the second trial on remand. The report condemns the execution 
of the mentally retarded and urges Governor Bush to stop the execution. 
Charles-Edward Anderson, Low-lQ Murderers, 75 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 26. 
This article discusses state treatment of mentally retarded defendants in 
capital cases in the wake of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). 
J. Vincent Aprile II, Executing the Mentally Retarded, CRIM. 1., Spring 1994, 
at 38. . 
This article looks at post-Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), 
legislation. The author notes that since Penry, eight states have enacted 
a prohibition against executing the mentally retarded. He argues this 
dramatic increase in the number of states prohibiting execution of the 
mentally retarded provides ammunition to mount another constitutional 
challenge. He urges each state to take a new look at whether the death 
penalty is appropriate for the mentally retarded. 
Philip C. Berg, Recent Developments, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 415 
(1990). 
This article reviews Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author asserts that 
critics of the decisions have an incomplete understanding of the Supreme 
Court's holdings. He asserts the debate in Penry and Stanford is not 
focused on the culpability of juvenile and mentally retarded offenders but 
is on federalism and the role of the Court. He argues a case-by-case 
analysis is appropriate and that principles of federalism dictate this 
analysis is a state role. He concludes this federalism is more appropriate 
than a bright line federal rule prohibiting executions of juveniles and the 
mentally retarded. 
Mary D. Bicknell, Note, Constitutional Law: The Eighth Amendment Does 
Not Prohibit the Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 
357 (1990). 
The author begins her note by discussing the definition and classification 
of mental retardation, the problems of the mentally retarded in the 
defense process, and prior significant Eighth Amendment case law. The 
main focus of the note is the examination of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
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392 (1989). As part of her analysis, she argues the Supreme Court does 
not properly understand the defect of retardation. She urges state 
legislatures to follow the Penry dissent and restrict the imposition of the 
death penalty on the mentally retarded. She suggests the states 
incorporate an instruction listing mental retardation as a mitigating 
factor, or establish a bright line rule prohibiting the execution of those 
with certain low I.Q. levels. 
Jamie Marie Billotte, Note, Is It Justified? - The Death Penalty and Mental 
Retardation, 8 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 333 (1994). 
The author examines the six standard purposes of punishment and 
discusses their application to the execution of the mentally retarded. She 
argues four of the six purposes cannot justify capital punishment at all, 
let alone for the mentally retarded. She rejects the remaining two 
purposes of deterrence and retribution because the mentally retarded do 
not have the same mental, emotional, and moral culpability as other adult 
offenders do. She finds the execution of the mentally retarded to be 
unacceptable. 
Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded From Capital 
Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations For the Future, 
22 N.Y.U REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1996). 
After giving background information on characteristics and definitions 
of the mentally retarded, the author looks at the rationales for executing 
the mentally retarded and concludes neither retribution nor deterrence 
justifies their execution. He points out the barriers facing the mentally 
retarded in the criminal justice system and concludes these barriers 
increase the likelihood a mentally retarded defendant will be found 
gUilty. He rebuts the arguments that a ban on the execution of the 
mentally retarded would lead to faise claims or that such protection 
would undercut the their independence. He examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 US. 392 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); and 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); and argues their national 
consensus methodology is flawed. After analyzing the effect of new 
Supreme Court members he concludes the Penry decision would likely 
be affirmed. After examining successful and unsuccessful state 
legislation banning the execution of the mentally retarded, he proposes 
a model law. 
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John Blume and David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An 
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REv. 725 (1988). 
In this article, the authors contend mentally retarded offenders may never 
constitutionally be put to death because death in these cases is an 
excessive punishment serving no penological goal. The authors suggest 
a legal presumption in favor of life once mental retardation has been 
established. 
Deon E. Brock, Assessing the Impact of Penry v. Lynaugh (1998) 
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Sam Houston State University) (on file with 
Sam Houston State University library). 
This dissertation looks at post-Penry legislation and its impact on Texas 
o 
cases. The author fIrst examines death penalty jurisprudence, Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and the resulting Texas statute. The 
author conducted a study of post-Penry cases. He fInds the new 
legislation has had no impact on consideration of mitigating evidence. 
Defendants abused as children or mentally ill were more likely to receive 
the death penalty. 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL? (Carol D. Foster et al. eds., 
1992). 
Part of the Information Series on Current Topics, this book gives an 
overview of the capital punishment debate. It includes summaries of 
landmark Supreme Court rulings, including those dealing with juveniles, 
psychiatric testimony, the insane, and the mentally retarded. It also 
reviews death penalty statutes, looking at the minimum age for 
execution, and at the treatment of mental retardation. The book also 
gives statistical information on executions, including breakdowns by age 
and education, and an overview of capital punishment around the world. 
J. Dwight Carmichael, Note, Penry v. Lynaugh: Texas Death Penalty 
Procedure Unconstitutionally Precludes Jury Consideration of Mitigating 
Evidence, 42 BAYLOR L. REv. 347 (1990). 
After giving a background on Supreme Court capital punishment rulings, 
the author examines the holding in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 
(1989), and looks at its effect on the Texas death penalty. He concludes 
the present statute is too flawed to be properly applied and asserts Texas 
must amend or replace the statute. He recommends either adding a 
fourth special issue addressing mitigating circumstances or replacing the 
statute with one instructing the sentencer to weigh mitigating and 
aggravating factors. 
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Sherri Ann Carver, Note, Retribution - A Justification For the Execution of 
Mentally Retarded and Juvenile Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 155 
(1991). 
The author ofthis note looks at Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), 
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and concludes these 
cases were correctly decided in light of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
and the retributive theory of jurisprudence. After analyzing the cases, 
she sets forth the general arguments against the death penalty and rebuts 
them. She discusses the deterrence and retributive punishment theories 
and applies these theories to the circumstances in Penry and Stanford. 
She asserts both defendants were capable of distinguishing right from 
wrong and evaluating various courses of action because they both killed 
to escape detection. She argues in both cases: the sentencer is always free 
to reject the death penalty if the juvenile or mentally retarded offender 
is not sufficiently culpable. 
Peter K.M. Chan, Note, Eighth Amendment - The Death Penalty and the 
Mentally Retarded Criminal: Fairness, Culpability, and Death, 80 J:CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1211 (1990). 
This note examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). The author 
concludes the Court correctly held the Texas statute was not per se 
unconstitutional but that the Texas special issues did not allow the jury 
to consider and give effect to all the relevant mitigating evidence. He 
argues the Court erred in holding that capital punishment for a mentally 
retarded offender is not cruel and unusual punishment. He asserts it 
violates the proportionality test. 
V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retarded From the 
Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida's Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REv. 457 (1991). 
The author discusses Florida's attempt to pass legislation banning the 
execution of mentally retarded offenders. He begins with a discussion 
of the history and treatment of the mentally retarded. He then gives an 
overview of death penalty jurisprudence. He traces the legislative 
response to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and urges Florida to 
pass legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders. 
He argues public opinion polls show Florida citizens oppose the 
execution of the mentally retarded. He asserts neither retribution nor 
deterrence support the death penalty for the mentally retarded due to the 
debilitating characteristics of their condition. Finally, he points out the 
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particular problems the mentally retarded face in the criminal justice 
system and why they need special protection in capital cases. 
Christopher S. Cook, Note, The Death Penalty and Mentally Retarded 
Criminal Defendants: A Re-examination in Light of Penry v. Lynaugh, 19 
CAP. U. L. REv. 869 (1990). 
After a discussion of mental retardation and of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 392 (1989), the author concludes treating mental retardation as a 
mitigating factor does not protect the mentally retarded defendant. He 
argues mentally retarded defendants are unable to form the necessary 
culpability to justify the death penalty. He compares the mentally 
retarded to the mentally ill. He argues the execution of the mentally 
retarded is not supported by the penological goals of deterrence or 
retribution. He asserts instructions directing juries to consider mental 
retardation as a mitigating factor do not protect mentally retarded 
offenders because juries often treat it as an aggravating factor. He 
proposes a presumption of life imprisonment rather than the death 
penalty. He also proposes a presumption that a mentally retarded 
offender is not competent to understand the nature of the charges against 
himlher or able to adequately assist in his/her defense. 
Thomas Criswell IV, Note, Death Penalty: Rios Grande: The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals Examines Mental Retardation as a Mitigating Factor in 
Rios v. Texas, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 373 (1994). 
This note examines the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Rios 
v. Texas, 846 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The author finds the 
Rios opinion requires more weight to be given to mitigating evidence of 
mental retardation than is required under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 
(1989), but criticizes the court for its confusing opinion. He argues the 
Rios court should have explicitly stated that a separate question 
concerning the defendant's mental retardation must be given to a jury. 
After looking at how other states deal with mental retardation and the 
death penalty, he concludes there is a growing movement to ban the 
execution of the mentally retarded. He predicts the Supreme Court will 
have a new opportunity to redetermine the evolving standards of decency 
and prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded. 
Donald E. d'Entremont, Case Comment, 24 SUFFOLK U L. REv. 221 (1990). 
In this examination of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 392 (1989), the author 
concludes the Supreme Court expanded the discretion of the sentencer 
in such a way as to re-establish the arbitrary and capricious imposition 
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of the death penalty. The author predicts this will lead to further 
litigation. 
David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of Florida Law, 
Fla. B.l, Feb. 1991, at 12. 
This article takes a look at the Florida approach to sentencing the 
mentally retarded in capital cases. The author begins by looking at the 
characteristics of mental retardation and at the Supreme Court's 
treatment of the mentally retarded in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 
(1989). After examining Florida's approach, he concludes that Florida 
is increasingly willing to consider the mentally retarded defendant as 
different than a normal adult defendant. He proposes that the state erect 
significant hurdles to the execution of the mentally retarded instead of a 
flat prohibition on such executions, and provides an example of how 
such a scheme could work. . 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967). 
This anthology on capital punishment, edited by noted abolitionist Hugo 
Bedau, collects works presenting information about the history and 
implementation of the death penalty, arguments for and against the death 
penalty, social science research on death penalty issues, and case 
histories. 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed., 1982). 
This later edition of Hugo Bedau's anthology on capital punishment 
includes chapters on deterrence, public attitudes towards the death 
penalty, error, constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and 
arguments for and against the death penalty. In the beginning chapters, 
Bedau discusses statutory mitigating circumstances such as diminished 
capacity, mental disturbance, and the age of the offender. 
Death Penalty Information Center at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgl (last 
visited Oct. I, 2000). 
This anti-death penalty site contains extensive information on the death 
penalty. It addresses special topics, among which are juveniles and the 
mentally retarded. The pages include statistics on the mentally retarded 
on death row and the mentally retarded executed. 
HeinOnline -- 21 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 227 2001
2001] WALKING THE EDGE OF DEATH 227 
Deborah W. Denno, Testing Penry and Its Progeny, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 
(1994). 
This article looks at post-Penry litigation in Texas. The author argues 
there is no support for the Texas Court's restrictive interpretation of the 
kind of mitigating evidence that can provide Penry relief. She also 
argues Penry's concept of mitigation and aggravation rests upon false 
. assumptions on the relationship between crime and future dangerousness. 
She uses the Biosocial Study to support her arguments. She asserts 
assumptions favoring internal mitigating factors, such as mental 
retardation, over external factors, such as lead poisoning, are 
inappropriate. 
Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme Court 
Deals a Fatal Blow to Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 699 (1990). . 
In this comment, the author examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 
(1989), and concludes the Supreme Court erred in not prohibiting the 
execution of mentally retarded defendants. In reaching this conclusion, 
she gives an overview of death penalty jurisprudence and then analyzes 
Penry. She criticizes the Court for failing to understand mental 
retardation. She argues the Court confused mental retardation and 
insanity and inaccurately assessed the national consensus against 
executing the mentally retarded. She also argues the Court erred when 
it unnecessarily discounted the reliability of defining retardation, failed 
to accept testimony on mental age, and mistakenly believed sentencers 
will consider mental retardation a mitigating factor. 
Richard C. Dieter,lnternational Perspectives On the Death Penalty: A Costly 
Isolationfor the U.S., at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglinternationalreport. 
html (Oct. 1999). 
This report discusses the international trend toward the abolition of the 
death penalty and the United States' position as a violator of human 
rights. Among the issues discussed is the execution of the mentally 
retarded. The report also discusses the costs of the United States' failure 
to abide by international law regarding capital cases. 
Licia A. Esposito, Note, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile and 
Mentally Retarded Offenders: A Precedential Analysis and Proposal for 
Reconsideration, 31 B.C. L. REv. 901 (1990). 
The author examines the evolution of the Supreme Court's definition of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Qause; looks at Thompson v. 
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Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); and concludes none 
of the Court's approaches adequately addresses the problems of juveniles 
and the mentally retarded. She argues the Court should adopt a 
compelling state interestlleast restrictive means approach to determine 
the constitutionality of juvenile and mentally retarded offender's death 
sentences. 
Philip L. Fetzer, Execution of the Mentally Retarded: A Punishment Without 
Justification, 40 S.C. L. REv. 419 (1989). 
After a discussion on the treatment of the mentally retarded, the author 
looks at the application of the Eighth Amendment to retarded offenders. 
Throughout the article, the author compares the mentally retarded to 
juveniles and the mentally ill. He argues executing the mentally retarded 
has no deterrent value because they have poor impulse control and 
underdeveloped concepts of causation and moral blameworthiness. He 
asserts social outrage cannot justify their execution because they cannot 
appreciate the causal connection between their actions and their death 
sentence. Thus, he concludes, retribution does not justify the execution 
of the mentally retarded. He argues the death penalty is excessive and 
out of proportion to the crime for mentally retarded offenders because of 
their lesser moral guilt. He proposes methods to reduce the numbers of 
mentally retarded offenders subject to capital punishment, one being that 
a finding of mental retardation creates a conclusive presumption of life 
during the sentencing phase. 
Timothy W. Floyd, Survey, Criminal Procedure, 22 TEx. TECH L. REv. 493 
(1991). 
This article is a review of Fifth Circuit death penalty cases decided 
between June 1, 1989 and May 31, 1990. The review discusses the 
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, with special emphasis on 
the Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). The 
review then examines post-Penry claims before the Fifth Circuit and the 
Circuit's attempts to decide how much and what kind of mitigating 
evidence is required for a valid Penry claim 
Robert P. Gritton, Comment, Capital Punishment: New Weapons in the 
Sentencing Process, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 423 (1990). 
This comment looks at the Supreme Court's approach to the death 
penalty in light of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 
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805 (1989). The author gives a brief analysis of the three cases. In 
Penry, he concludes the Court should have employed a heightened 
scrutiny test to determine the applicability of the death penalty in light 
of the varying degrees of retardation. He further concludes that pursuant 
to common law and judicial economy, the appropriate minimum age for 
capital punishment should be fifteen. He finds deterrence is not served 
by executing juveniles and the mentally retarded because neither 
performs a cost-benefit analysis before acting. He finds retribution is 
served only if society has placed an increased value on vengeance and 
lowered the threshold for the acceptability of retribution. 
Patricia Hagenah, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence On Mentally Retarded 
Defendants: The Case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 59 UMKC L. REv. 135 (1990). 
This note examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and 
concludes the Court erred in failing to protect mentally retarded 
offenders form the death penalty. The author argues the dissent's 
rejection of a proportionality review is improper because limiting the 
proportionality review to punishments condemned in 1789 leaves the 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment static, and by focusing solely on 
legislation to determine the evolving standards of decency means 
political majorities define the Eighth Amendment. She asserts Justice 
O'Connor erred in advocating an approach where mental retardation is 
a mitigating factor. She argues the sentencer may not properly weigh 
mental retardation as a mitigating factor because it may offer greater 
weight as an aggravating factor. 
HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (1996). 
This book discusses the anti-death penalty movement in America from 
1972 to 1994. The author examines the efforts to develop a multi 
organizational network to attack the death penalty. He discusses the 
involvement and contributions of Amnesty International. Amnesty 
International pushed for incremental attacks on the death penalty and 
pursued studies revealing the lack of public support for executions of 
those under eighteen, those with a history of mental illness, and the 
mentally retarded. The book reports the success of legislation 
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded. 
Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Beyond Penry: The Remedial Use of the Mentally 
Retarded Label in Death Penalty Sentencing, 59 UMKCL. REv. 17 (1990). 
The author argues a class-wide prohibition on the execution of mentally 
retarded offenders is necessary to ensure fair and equitable treatment in 
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the criminal justice system. He argues that in Penry v. Lynaugh,492 
U.S. 392 (1989), the Court ignores the nature and consequences of 
mental retardation. He looks at the damage that the label of mental 
retardation causes. He argues proportionality demands diminished 
culpability for mentally retarded offenders, and he finds that the 
traditional justifications of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution fail 
when applied to the mentally retarded. He fmds Penry' s individualized 
mitigation to be inadequate because the mentally retarded are unable to 
utilize the full range of procedural protections offered by the legal system 
due to their diminished capabilities, and thus are punished 
disproportionately. He further asserts jurors stereotype and cannot 
properly give weight to mental retardation as a mitigating factor. 
Linda L. Hinton, Case Note, Criminal Law, 39 Drake L. Rev. 921 
(1989/1990). 
This is a case note that analyzes Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). 
The author concludes that any expansion of the Eighth Amendment 
protection to anyone class of persons is doubtful. 
Denis W. Keyes and William J. Edwards, Mental Retardation and the Death 
Penalty: Current Status of Exemption Legislation, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 687 (1997). 
This article looks at post-Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), 
legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded. The 
authors examine the Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, Washington, 
and federal government statutes. They conclude that with these new 
statutes prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the 
Supreme Court should reverse its decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
392 (1989). 
Denis W. Keyes, et at., Mitigating Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: 
Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MBNT AL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. 
REP. 529 (1998). 
The authors look at the nature and extent of the problem of the mentally 
retarded in capital cases. They define mental retardation and provide a 
guide for defense attorneys to use. They conclude that mental retardation 
is often not explored as a mitigating factor and that the culpability of a 
mentally retarded defendant is such that the death penalty should not be 
imposed. 
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BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT 
CASES ON CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (1998). 
This book contains excerpts of the Supreme Court cases on the death 
penalty. It also contains a brief overview of the history of the Eighth 
Amendment, capital laws and procedures, and the capital punishment 
debate. The appendix contains facts and figures on murder and the death 
penalty. Cases discussed that are relevant to this bibliography include 
Stanfordv. Kentucky,492U.S. 361 (1989); Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399 (1986); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). 
James S. Liebman and Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing 
Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating 
Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978). 
This article examines five Supreme Court decisions handed down on July 
2, 1976: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,428 
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 
(1976). The authors distill from these cases a doctrinal framework of the 
Eighth Amendment. They assert a statute attempting to enumerate 
exclusive mitigatory factors is unconstitutional and that a defendant has 
a right to jury instructions on guided individualization. The authors 
apply their doctrinal framework to the treatment of mental illness as a 
mitigation and conclude a mentally disordered offender should receive 
mitigatory consideration. In order to determine the degree of mitigation, 
they propose a four-factor analysis. They apply this analysis to the 
mentally retarded and the sociopath and conclude there is a compelling 
case for reducing a death sentence for a mentally retarded offender. 
Edward Miller, Note, Executing Minors and the Mentally Retarded: The 
Retribution and Deterrence Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 15 (1990). 
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and concludes the Supreme Court erred 
in its assessment of the deterrence and retributive values of sentencing 
juveniles and the mentally retarded to death. The author gives a 
background of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the 
evolution of the deterrence and· retributive analysis. He criticizes 
Justices O'Connor and Scalia for abandoning the penological purpose 
test in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He looks at Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and argues Justice O'Connor distorts the 
penological purpose test. The author then performs his own analysis and 
finds the characteristics of juveniles and the mentally retarded preclude 
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~he required level of culpability necessary for the death penalty. He 
argues this lesser culpability does not fulfill the goal of retribution. He 
also argues that the poor impulse control, lack of strategic thinking, and 
difficulty seeing their mortality means it is unlikely the goal of 
deterrence is served by executing juveniles and the mentally retarded. 
Moratorium 2000, at http://www.moratorium2000.org/aboucuslindex.lasso 
(last visited Oct. 1,2000). 
This Web site is by a nonprofit, nonpolitical organization dedicated to 
establishing a moratorium on the death penalty. This site contains 
reports on the execution of the mentally retarded. 
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, at http://www.ncadp.org (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2000). 
This Web site is by a coalition of organizations and individuals who are 
committed to abolishing the death penalty. The site contains several fact 
sheets concerning various aspects of the death penalty~ One such fact 
sheet discusses the execution of the mentally retarded. The fact sheet 
gives facts and figures on the mentally retarded on death row and the 
numbers of executions. 
John Parry, The Rehnquist - Scalia Court Takes Hold - Part 1: The Death 
Penalty and Abortion, 13 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 318 
(1989). 
This article takes a look at Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and 
the dualism reflected in the majority opinion. The author asserts that 
although there was narrow consensus in the decision, there was no 
consensus in the Court's reasoning. He finds Justice Scalia's reasoning 
to be the weakest and Justice O'Connor's middle ofthe road opinion to 
be the best reasoned, although weak in that it does not discuss what is an 
incapacity to be executed. He.believes Justice Brennan's dissent errs in 
not requiring an individualized assessment of mental status. 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991). 
This book on the death penalty is divided into five parts. Part I gives an 
overview of capital punishment. Part II discusses the legal challenges to 
the death penalty pre-Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and 
discusses legal challenges and reform of the death penalty after Gregg v. 
Georgia. This part addresses mitigation evidence such as youth or 
mental illness. This part also examines the execution of special groups 
such as the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. The Supreme 
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Court cases of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988); and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), are discussed. 
Part ill deals with racial discrimination and arbitrariness. Part IV 
discusses arguments for and against the death penalty. Part V looks at 
alternatives to capital punishment. 
Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal 
Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or 
"Doctrinal Abyss ?", 29 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1987). 
The author discusses whether there is any doctrinal consistency in cases 
dealing with mentally disabled defendants. He discusses eight cases: 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Jones v. United States, 463 
U.S. 354 (1983); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Estelle v. Smith, 
451 U.S. 454 (1981); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986); 
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 478 U.S. 364 
(1986); and Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399(1986). Heexarnineshow 
the Court has dealt with common elements involving the type of penalty 
and crime and type of psychiatric diagnosis. He looks at whether the 
justices' positions reflect any themes. He identifies extra-legal principles 
that might be guiding the Court. He also examines symbols in the cases. 
He concludes there are some doctrinal threads that concern the Court's 
fear of executing a truly insane prisoner and shocking the public's 
conscience. However, he finds no real doctrinal consistency at this time. 
ROBERT PERSKE, DEADLY INNOCENCE? (1995). 
The author relates the story of Joe Arridy, a mentally retarded man 
executed January 6, 1939. Perske believes Arridy's confession was a 
false one and he details the justice system's prejudices and failings 
toward the mentally retarded. The book is a strong statement against 
executing the mentally retarded. 
Robert Perske and Shirley Dicks, The Mentally Retarded and the Justice 
System, in YOUNG BLOOD 75 (Shirley Dicks ed., 1995). 
This chapter looks at the characteristics of the mentally retarded that lead 
to their victimization in the criminal justice system. The authors note the 
large number of mentally retarded offenders on death row. They look 
specifically at two cases. 
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Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court and 
Capital Punishment: Should the U.S.A. Put the Death Penalty to Death?, 50 
N. IR. LEGAL Q. 50 (1999). 
This article gives an overview of important death penalty cases. In 
particular it discusses Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), 
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), concerning juveniles; 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), concerning the insane; and 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), concerning the mentally 
retarded. 
Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishment For Mentally Retarded 
Offenders: Is It Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. 
REv. 89 (1990). 
After discussing the historical foundations and justifications for the death 
penalty and the Eighth Amendment, the author considers the similarities 
between insanity, youth, and mental retardation. She argues the mentally 
retarded should receive the same special treatment as juveniles and the 
mentally ill because they too possess a lesser criminal and moral 
culpability. Drawing heavily on the American Bar Association's Mental 
Health Standards, she proposes guidelines for determining competency 
to stand trial and competency for execution for the mentally retarded. 
Emily A. Reed, Capital Punishment and Offenders with Mental Retardation, 
in SOCIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY 2 11 (Laura E. Rand ed., 1997). 
This chapter discusses why mentally retarded offenders should never be 
sentenced to death. The author begins with a definition of mental 
retardation. She follows with an explanation of the characteristics of the 
mentally retarded. She fmds these characteristics prevent the mentally 
retarded from being fully culpable for their criminal actions, and thus 
they should be ineligible for the death penalty. She argues the Court 
erred in its assessment of a national consensus in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 392 (1989). She finds society does not want the mentally retarded. 
executed. She argues individualized sentencing is inadequate to protect 
the mentally retarded since evidence of mental retardation for mitigation 
purposes is also used for aggravating purposes. She rebuts arguments 
about multiple claims overwhelming the justice system and arguments 
concerning main streaming. 
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Dee Reid. Unknowing Punishment. STUDENT LAW .• May 1987. at 18. 
This article looks at the problems mentally retarded offenders possess 
that may lead to large numbers of them residing on death row. The 
article notes the mentally retarded often confess to crimes they did not 
commit and that they do not understand their civil rights. Another 
problem the article recognizes, is that the courts. psychologists. 
psychiatrists. and defense attorneys often do not recognize mental 
retardation. Experts quoted in the article assert mental retardation can 
interfere with the ability to make appropriate judgments. resist negative 
influences. and understanding the nature and consequences of an action. 
The author argues most state laws regarding competency address insanity 
and not mental retardation. Additionally, the article notes. the mentally 
retarded have poor communications skills. poor recall. and do not 
understand the implications of a guilty plea. Furthermore, raising the 
issue of mental retardation may result in its being used against the 
defendant. The article provides the case summaries of five mentally 
retarded offenders on death row. 
Cecil A. Rhodes. The Killing of John Paul Penry: Are General Social 
Deterrence or Retributive Purposes Served in Executing Mentally 
Handicapped Defendants? 21 LINCOLNL. REv. 65 (1993). 
This article looks at the national consensus condemning the execution of 
mentally retarded criminal defendants. The author points out society. 
courts. and the legislatures have recognized the difference. mistreatment. 
and discrimination associated with the mentally retarded. He argues that 
in Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 392 (1989). there was ample objective 
evidence to show a national consensus against executing the mentally 
retarded. He asserts that because of Penry's mental retardation and low 
level of culpability. killing him made no contribution to the penological 
goals of deterrence and retribution. The author concludes the execution 
of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment and that the 
Court has abandoned its role in our constitutional system. 
Dian Sharon Rubanoff. Note. Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Die: Mercy 
in the Hands of the Jury, 11 WHITTIERL. REv. 845 (1990). 
This note looks at Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 392 (1989). and concludes 
that allowing consideration of mental retardation as a mitigating factor 
may not adequately protect mentally retarded offenders. The author 
argues the Penry decision was foreseeable from past decisions and that 
regardless of the type of mitigating evidence. capital sentencing juries 
must be given a method of considering all legitimate mitigating evidence. 
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In examining the issue of a blanket prohibition on executing the mentally 
retarded, the author argues it is difficult to show a national consensus 
against executing the mentally retarded. She finds Justice O'Connor's 
belief in the proportionality doctrine significant, but notes 0' Connor has 
never found the punishment excessive under that doctrine. The author 
argues the rise of prejudice and fear among jury members may mean 
juries are incapable of giving mental retardation its proper mitigating 
effect. 
David L. Rumley, Comment, A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption 
of the Mentally Retarded From the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299 
(1993). 
After looking at the historical treatment of mental deficiencies, the 
characteristics of persons with mental retardation, and I.Q. tests, the 
author concludes a person's I.Q. should not be proof of mental 
retardation. He argues mental retardation does not mean an individual 
is less culpable. He suggests the following guidelines when dealing with 
a mentally retarded defendant: the defendant must be found mentally 
culpable at the time of the offense, the defendant must be competent to 
stand trial, the trier-of-fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt every 
element of the crime, the sentencer must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance, and the defendant must 
understand the impending execution. 
Eric L. Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' 
Intent Doctrine, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Qv. CONFINEMENT 315 (1990). 
This case comment discusses Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). 
After discussing the facts and opinions of the case, the author argues the 
Court erred in applying the framers' intent doctrine. He asserts that a 
close reading of the historical record from the sixteenth through the 
eighteenth century would find Penry would likely have been considered 
an "idiot" and thus incapable of being executed. He criticizes the 
Court's reliance on nineteenth and twentieth century classifications of 
"idiocy." He further argues that the penological goals of retribution and 
deterrence are not served by executing the mentally retarded. 
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, Defending Categorical Exemptions to the 
Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA's Resolutions Concerning the 
Execution of Juveniles and Persons With Mental Retardation, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autunm 1998, at 89. 
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In this article the authors argue juveniles and the mentally retarded 
should be exempted from the death penalty. They discuss Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the weaknesses of the proportionality 
analysis. They argue the American Bar Association and others seeking 
to ban executions of juveniles and the mentally retarded should focus 
their arguments on the following doctrinal requirements: narrowing the 
class eligible, channeling the discretion of capital sentencers, ensuring 
the consideration of mitigating factors, and securing heightened 
reliability. 
Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Second Class 
Citizens in Capital Punishment, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT Wrm CAPITAL 
PuNISHMENT 201 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998). 
This chapter looks at three frequently excluded classes from capital 
punishment: women, children, and the mentally retarded. The author 
examines the social policies and realities behind the reluctance to 
execute people in these groups. As part of his analysis, the author gives 
statistics on members of each group on death row or executed. He also 
gives historical backgrounds. The policies he looks at are culpability; 
legislative enactments; jury sentences; public opinion polls; and the 
penological goals of incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution. He 
concludes that the reasons for screening out juveniles and the mentally 
retarded are more justifiable than those for women. 
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath Penry Wrought? Mitigating 
Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 Am. J. Crim. L. 345 (1992). 
This article looks at Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the Texas 
response. The author focuses primarily on Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
392 (1989). In addressing Penry claims, the author notes the Texas court 
has only given relief for factual circumstances presenting mitigating 
evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse. The author reviews 
the new Texas death penalty scheme and concludes it passes 
constitutional muster by allowing individualized consideration of the 
defendant's character, background, and circumstance of the offense, and 
specifically by addressing Penry concerns. 
ROBERT H. THOMAS AND JOHN D. HUTCHESON, JR., GEORGIA RESIDENTS' 
ATIITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY, THE DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS, AND RELATED IsSUES (1986). 
This report provides the findings of a sample of over 900 Georgia 
residents. Forty-one questions were asked concerning: the crime rate and 
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judicial system; imprisonment and the death penalty; judicial process, 
imprisonment, and the death penalty for juvenile offenders; fairness of 
the death penalty; and alternatives to the death penalty. The survey 
found 66% of Georgia residents believe the mentally retarded should not 
receive the death penalty. 
University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center, Focus On the Death Penalty, 
at http://www.uaa.alaska.eduljust/deathlissues.html (last visited Oct. 1,2000). 
This Web site attempts to provide links to resources from both sides of 
·the death penalty debate. This particular area of the site addresses 
specific issues. In addition to information on deterrence; retribution and 
justice for murder victims; the innocent; limiting appeals and habeas 
corpus reform; costs of the death penalty; alternative sentencing; 
fairness; moratorium; cruel and unusual punishment; and women, the site 
provides links to statistical information and cases concerning juveniles, 
the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill. 
Salvador C. Uy, Note, From the Ashes o/Penry v. Lynaugh: The Diminished 
Intent Approach to the Trial and Sentencing 0/ the Mentally Retarded 
Offender, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 565 (1990). 
The author examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and 
concludes the Supreme Court did not properly understand the nature and 
effects of mental retardation. The note fust looks at the definition of 
mental retardation and then at the Penry Court's treatment of mitigation. 
The author next examines the Eighth Amendment analysis in the 
decision. He argues the Court incorrectly confused mental illness with 
mental retardation and erroneously concluded the insanity defense 
statutes would protect the mentally retarded. He discusses why 
diminished capacity as it currently stands does not protect the mentally 
retarded defendant and proposes a diminished intent statute that will 
protect the mentally retarded from execution. 
WilliamK. Wetzonis, Capital Punishment/or Mentally RetardedDe/endants: 
A Boundary For the Eighth Amendment Is Drawn, 34 How. LJ. 651 (1991). 
This article begins with an analysis of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 
(1989), and concludes the death penalty should not be applied to 
mentally retarded defendants. The author points to the problems 
identifying the mentally retarded offender and the mentally retarded 
-defendant's lack of mens rea. He compares treatment of the mentally 
retarded to juveniles and the mentally ill and finds the Supreme Court's 
conflicting views to be misdirected. Finally, he argues the penological 
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goals of deterrence and retribution are not served by executing the 
mentally retarded. 
Virginia O. Wilson, Note, Penry v. Lynaugh: Mentally Retarded Defendants 
and the Death Penalty, 34 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 345 (1990). 
After discussing mental retardation and death penalty jurisprudence, the 
author examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). She concludes 
the Court correctly held the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit 
execution of the mentally retarded. She argues legislation and court 
decisions show a trend toward treating the mentally retarded as ordinary 
adults. She believes a blanket prohibition would violate the penological 
justification of retribution. She fmds that since the mentally retarded 
may possess cognitive disabilities, they may be less culpable, and thus 
should have their condition considered as a mitigating factor. 
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